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As exemplified by the dramatic failure of AIG, insurance companies and their
affiliates played a central role in the 2008 global financial crisis. It is therefore not
surprising that the Dodd-Frank Act—the United States’ primary legislative response to the crisis—contained an entire title dedicated to insurance regulation,
which has traditionally been the responsibility of individual states. The most important insurance-focused reforms in Dodd-Frank empower the Federal Reserve
Bank to impose an additional layer of regulatory scrutiny on top of state insurance
regulation for a small number of “systemically important” nonbank financial companies, such as AIG. This Article argues, however, that in focusing on the risk that
an individual insurance-focused, nonbank financial company could become systemically significant, Dodd-Frank largely overlooked a second, and equally important, potential source of systemic risk in insurance: the prospect that correlations among individual insurance companies could contribute to or cause
widespread financial instability. In fact, this Article argues that there are often
substantial correlations among individual insurance companies with respect to
both their interconnections with the larger financial system and their vulnerabilities to failure. As a result, the insurance industry as a whole can pose systemic
risks that regulation should attempt to identify and manage. Traditional statebased insurance regulation, this Article contends, is poorly adapted to accomplishing this given the mismatch between state boundaries and systemic risks, as well
as states’ limited oversight of noninsurance financial markets. As such, this Article
suggests enhancing the power of the Federal Insurance Office—a federal entity
primarily charged with monitoring the insurance industry—to supplement or
preempt state law when states have failed to satisfactorily address gaps or deficiencies in insurance regulation that could contribute to systemic risk.
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INTRODUCTION
Insurance companies played a central role in the 2008 global financial crisis. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of
American International Group (AIG), an insurance-focused financial enterprise whose receipt of $180 billion from the federal
government amounts to the largest bailout of a private company
in history.1 Given AIG’s prominence in the 2008 financial crisis,
1
William K. Sjostrom Jr, The AIG Bailout, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev 943, 974–75
(2009); Mark Felsenthal and Lilla Zuill, US Government Increases AIG Bailout to $150
Bln, Reuters (Nov 11, 2008), online at http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/11/10/idINIndia
-36425020081110 (visited Nov 3, 2014). AIG Financial Products, a subsidiary of AIG that
was most often identified as the cause of AIG’s failure, was not itself an insurance company. See text accompanying notes 69–81. See also Jeffrey E. Thomas, Insurance Perspectives on Federal Financial Regulatory Reform: Addressing Misunderstandings and
Providing a View from a Different Paradigm, 55 Vill L Rev 773, 773–77 (2010) (arguing
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it is hardly surprising that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act2—the United States’ primary legislative response to the crisis—directly addresses the risk that a
nonbank financial company like AIG could become “too big to
fail.”3 In particular, the Act supplements insurance regulation
by subjecting nonbank financial companies deemed systemically
significant to enhanced regulation by the Federal Reserve Bank
(“Fed”).4 To date, three insurance-focused nonbank financial
companies—including, of course, AIG—have been designated as
systemically risky.5
AIG, however, was not the only insurance-focused financial
company that played a role in the financial crisis. An entire
segment of the insurance industry—the financial-guarantee insurers—dramatically destabilized financial markets as it became clear that these insurers would be unable to pay claims on
policies insuring against the default of mortgage-backed securities.6 Meanwhile, various large, non-AIG, life insurance companies
experienced substantial decreases in capital during the crisis
that “insurance had little, if any, role in the crisis” because “AIG’s collapse was not an
insurance problem”). However, AIG Financial Products was able to amass the risk that it
did only by leveraging the financial strength of the AIG holding company, and by doing
so, it directly imperiled AIG’s many insurance companies. See Sjostrom, 66 Wash & Lee
L Rev at 958 & n 88 (noting that AIG was leveraging its credit rating, which allowed Financial Products to take on substantial risk). Moreover, a central cause of AIG’s failure
was a securities-lending program that lent out AIG insurers’ safe securities and replaced
them with mortgage-backed securities. See id at 961 (“Unfortunately, AIG Investments
had invested a significant portion of the cash [that it received as collateral for lent securities]
in residential mortgage-backed securities which had plummeted in value and liquidity.”).
2
Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
3
See Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and
the Next Financial Meltdown 200–13 (Pantheon 2010) (discussing the too-big-to-fail
problem, and concluding that the regulatory solution is to prevent financial institutions
from attaining this status and break up institutions that already have).
4
See Dodd-Frank § 113, 124 Stat at 1398–1402, codified at 12 USC § 5323 (granting the Fed authority to supervise and regulate nonbank financial companies that, due
to enumerated characteristics, pose a threat to the financial stability of the United
States).
5
Fitch Ratings, Press Release, Non-bank SIFI Status Neutral to Insurance Ratings
(June 4, 2013), online at https://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/Non
-Bank-SIFI-Status?pr_id=792828 (visited Nov 3, 2014). A third insurer is currently appealing its designation as systemically risky. See Zachary Tracer and Ian Katz, MetLife Challenges Risk Tag, Sets Stage for Court Clash (Bloomberg Oct 3, 2014), online at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-03/metlife-challenges-risk-tag-sets-stage-for-court
-clash.html (visited Nov 3, 2014).
6
See Robert P. Bartlett III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study
of Derivative Disclosures during the Financial Crisis, 36 J Corp L 1, 1–42 (2010) (examining the financial-guarantee industry’s heavy exposure to complex credit derivatives
leading up to the financial crisis). See also Part I.B.
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due to losses in their investment portfolios coupled with longterm guarantees to policyholders.7 Two of these companies received federal bailout funds through the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), several more applied for bailouts, and many
more were the beneficiaries of capital relief through ad hoc
changes in accounting rules by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).8
Unlike AIG, none of the individual financial-guarantee insurers and virtually none of the life insurers that were implicated in the financial crisis were “too big to fail.”9 Instead, these insurers were caught up in the crisis because of commonalities in
their risk exposures and interconnections to the larger financial
system. In the case of the financial-guarantee insurers, these
commonalities involved an industry-wide trend toward insuring
payment on complex—and risky—mortgage-backed securities.10
And in the case of life insurers, these commonalities involved
guarantees on annuity products and investments in mortgagebacked securities.11 In each case, the result was that a number of
insurance companies that were not individually too big to fail
were collectively able to pose a material risk to the larger financial system.12
In contrast to its enhanced regulation of too-big-to-fail,
insurance-focused financial firms such as AIG, Dodd-Frank did
relatively little to address the prospect that clusters of insurance
companies or entire segments of the insurance industry could
collectively pose systemic risks because of commonalities in their

7
See US Government Accountability Office, Insurance Markets: Impacts of and
Regulatory Response to the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis *9, 28–32 (GAO-13-583, June
2013) (“GAO Report”), online at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655612.pdf (visited Nov 3,
2014).
8
See Scott E. Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance Regulation, 76 J Risk & Ins 785, 788 (2009) (identifying the insurance companies that
applied for and received TARP funds, and noting the availability of ad hoc modifications).
9
See Marc Labonte, Systemically Important or “Too Big to Fail” Financial Institutions *1 (July 30, 2013), online at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42150.pdf (visited
Nov 3, 2014) (noting that only two nonbanks have been designated systemically important, or too big to fail, by the Financial Stability Oversight Council).
10 See Bartlett, 36 J Corp L at 4 (cited in note 6).
11 See GAO Report at *28–30 (cited in note 7).
12 For a discussion of the possibility that correlations among individual firms could
result in systemic risk, see Ian Ayres and Joshua Mitts, Anti-herding Regulation, 4 Harv
Bus L Rev *32–34 (forthcoming 2014), online at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/Anti
-Herding%20Regulation.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (defining “systemic risk as the conditional correlation of asset returns of the financial system in response to events occurring
to individual firms within it”).
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risk exposures or interconnections with the larger financial system.13 Instead, Dodd-Frank left largely unchanged the traditional system of state-based insurance regulation for all but the
small number of insurance-focused financial firms that are individually deemed systemically significant or that own a depository institution.14 As a result, the vast majority of insurers (other
than health insurers) continue to be regulated solely by individual states rather than the federal government.15
This Article argues that Dodd-Frank’s failure to address the
prospect that systemic risk in insurance could arise outside of
individual, too-big-to-fail institutions represents a substantial
flaw in US financial regulation. It suggests that correlations
among insurance companies—involving their products, investment strategies, or risk-management techniques, among other
things—can themselves contribute to systemic instability. These
correlations can arise from numerous sources including competition, insurance regulatory restrictions that apply equally to all
insurers,16 shared suppositions and strategies embedded within
the insurance industry,17 and rational herding among insurance
companies and executives.18 Whatever their source, we argue
that these correlations can contribute to systemic risk by producing substantial interconnections between entire segments of
the insurance industry and the rest of the financial system, or
by causing a risk of mass instability within the insurance industry itself.
In advancing the claim that the business of insurance can
indeed be systemically risky, we part ways with much of the extant academic literature on the topic.19 Broadly speaking, this
13

See Part I.C.
See Scott E. Harrington, Insurance Regulation and the Dodd-Frank Act *11–12
(Networks Financial Institute Policy Brief, Mar 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1783904 (visited Nov 3, 2014).
15 See David Zaring, It Is Time to Rethink Insurance Regulation, NY Times
DealBook (NY Times Jan 22, 2014), online at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/it
-is-time-to-rethink-insurance-regulation (visited Nov 3, 2014).
16 See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 Cornell L Rev 323, 346–
57 (2011) (discussing how regulation that promotes coordination can have perverse effects that increase risk).
17 See Geoffrey P. Miller and Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 807, 811–15 (2010).
18 See Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation 40 (Routledge
2014).
19 For analyses that largely dismiss the possibility that the insurance industry is
systemically risky outside of certain limited, nontraditional activities, see, for example,
14
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literature has been spearheaded by economists who argue that
the only real systemic risks associated with insurance involve
“nontraditional” insurance activities or noninsurance activities
engaged in by insurers. Within these abstract categories are
usually included only the specific insurer (or insurer affiliate)
activities that were most clearly implicated in the 2008 crisis,
particularly writing derivatives and financial-guarantee insurance. These analyses often dismiss alternative potential sources
of systemic risk in insurance because of the perceived lack of
historical precedents. They also emphasize that the magnitudes
of insurers’ potential interconnections with one another or the
larger financial system are not large enough to be systemically
significant and that insurers’ liabilities have historically been
long-term, limiting the risk of a run on an insurer. For these
reasons, they tend to conclude or suggest that even the limited
insurance-oriented reforms embedded within Dodd-Frank are
excessive.20
By contrast, we reject this historically bound methodology
for assessing systemic risk in insurance. This approach, if employed in 2004, would have concluded that AIG’s portfolio of
credit default swaps (CDSs) could not be systemically risky due
to its relatively small size at the time. It would have ignored as
empirically unsupported the risk that the structure of AIG’s

Richard Herring and Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks,
Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in Hal S. Scott, ed, Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance 15, 23–24 (Oxford 2005); Robert W.
Klein, The Insurance Industry and Its Regulation: An Overview, in Martin F. Grace and
Robert W. Klein, eds, The Future of Insurance Regulation in the United States 13, 28
(Brookings 2009) (observing that, with certain exceptions, “it is not clear that the insurance industry poses the kind of systemic risk to other markets as that posed by banks or
other financial institutions”); Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 804 (cited in note 8); Mary
A. Weiss, Systemic Risk and the U.S. Insurance Sector *2 (unpublished draft, Center for
Insurance Policy & Research, Feb 23, 2010), online at http://www.naic.org/documents/
cipr_weiss_systemic_risk_100223.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (“[A]nalysis suggests that insurers are not instigators or the cause of systemic risk.”); J. David Cummins and Mary
A. Weiss, Systemic Risk and the U.S. Insurance Sector *30–39 (Department of Risk, Insurance, and Healthcare Management Working Paper, July 27, 2011), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1725512 (visited Nov 3, 2014) (finding that core activities of insurers pose little systemic risk, while noncore activities are
more problematic). In another article, one of us has also briefly endorsed this view. See
Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation? Against
Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 Minn L Rev 1707, 1753–54 (2010) (arguing that
insurance “generally does not create substantial systemic risks . . . [because] the availability and proper functioning of insurance is not a prerequisite to most systemically important economic activities”).
20 See Parts I.A, I.C.
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CDS business—which allowed the company to write insurancelike products and book the premiums as pure profit while relying on complex and opaque internal risk models concluding that
these guarantees would never be triggered—could produce systemic consequences.
Unlike this literature, we approach the regulation of systemic risk in insurance with a deep appreciation for the possibility that systemic risk can crop up in new and distinctive guises
due to the massive complexity and interconnections that have
evolved, and continue to evolve, within our financial system.21
For these reasons, the need for regulation of systemic risk in insurance must be determined in part by attempting to proactively
anticipate new potential sources of systemic risk based on structural vulnerabilities of the insurance industry and structural interconnections between the insurance industry and the rest of
the financial system. Although that analysis must be deeply informed by available empirical evidence, it should not assume—
unlike most of the extant economics literature—that the future
will resemble the past or present.
To illustrate these points, we review emerging evidence
suggesting that insurers were partially responsible both for inflating the value of mortgage-backed securities prior to the crisis
and for disrupting markets in these securities in the midst of the
crisis.22 These effects were not the result of a single insurer’s
21 See Insurance Oversight and Legislative Proposals, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing and Community Opportunity of the Committee on Financial Services, 112th Cong, 1st Sess 54 (2011) (statement of Daniel Schwarcz, University
of Minnesota Law School):

[T]he proposed legislation seems to ignore one of the central lessons of the 2008
Global Financial Crisis: that we do not always know what we do not know
when it comes to systemic risk. . . . [I]t ensconces the traditional view that insurance activities pose limited systemic risk and restricts the capacity of federal regulators to learn as they go and adapt to evolving research and knowledge.
It does this by effectively exempting insurers from the heightened prudential
standards that ought to apply to systemically risky firms, by limiting the tools
available to federal agencies to investigate systemic risk within insurance
companies, and by undermining the capacity of federal regulators to respond to
facts on the ground that reveal the threat of systemic risk.
22 See Craig B. Merrill, et al, Did Capital Requirements and Fair Value Accounting
Spark Fire Sales in Distressed Mortgage-Backed Securities? *30–31 (NBER Working Paper No 18270, Aug 2012), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18270 (visited Nov 3,
2014) (concluding that, based on statistical evidence, insurance companies facing capitalization problems are more likely to sell mortgage-backed securities at lower prices);
Craig B. Merrill, Taylor D. Nadauld, and Philip E. Strahan, Final Demand for Structured Finance Securities *2 (working paper, Mar 2014), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2380859 (visited Nov 3, 2014) (arguing that insurance companies distorted demand for
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investment strategy but were instead a product of numerous life
insurers pursuing similar investment strategies in order to exploit regulatory restrictions and respond to common losses resulting from their issuances of annuity products containing embedded interest-rate guarantees.23 Although the magnitudes of
these effects are unclear and contested, we focus our analysis on
the structural connections that they reveal between the insurance industry and the rest of the financial system. In particular,
these effects demonstrate that insurers’ massive role as investors and as a source of funding in the US real estate and corporate sectors creates the risk that instability in insurance markets could trigger much broader financial consequences.
These and similar potential systemic risks suggest a need
for a regulatory structure that is designed to proactively identify, assess, and manage new potential sources of systemic risk in
insurance that are not localized within an individual company.
Traditional state-based insurance regulation, this Article argues, is ill suited to meet these objectives.24 Individual states are
likely to experience only a small amount of the harm that systemic events can produce in the economy writ large.25 States
consequently have inadequate incentives to police against this
risk, especially to the extent that doing so is in tension with
their more traditional goals, be it consumer protection or premium tax collection.26 Even properly motivated state regulators
and legislatures lack the perspective and expertise to manage
systemic risk. States long ago lost most of their regulatory authority and expertise over the banking and securities industries,27 meaning that they do not have a global or even national
perspective on the financial system as a whole. In fact, the
fragmented nature of state regulation often prevents state regulators from developing a larger perspective on risks in the insurance industry itself.28
Although we conclude that Dodd-Frank’s reforms of insurance
regulation are insufficient to address systemic risk in insurance,
various asset-backed securities before the financial crisis). See also text accompanying
notes 157–59.
23 See text accompanying notes 156–63.
24 See Part III.A.
25 See text accompanying notes 311–29.
26 See Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U Chi L Rev 335, 351–52
(1990) (arguing that national markets require national regulation).
27 See text accompanying notes 331–34.
28 See text accompanying notes 338–44.
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we also argue that Dodd-Frank explicitly opened the door for
one potentially effective solution to this shortcoming. The Act established within the Department of the Treasury the Federal
Insurance Office (FIO) to monitor the insurance industry and its
regulation.29 As it is constructed in Dodd-Frank, the FIO has no
regulatory authority over any insurers.30 Expanding the power of
the FIO to supplement or preempt state laws would help address the prospect that systemic risk in insurance could arise
outside of individual systemically significant firms.31 Unlike the
states, the FIO is reasonably well suited to identify and respond
to emerging systemic risks in the insurance system given its
global perspective and accountability to a national constituency.
To limit the prospect that the FIO might be too aggressive in exercising this authority and aggrandizing its own power, the
FIO’s proposals to supplement or preempt state law might need
to be approved by the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC)—the same entity that Dodd-Frank empowers to identify
individual insurance-focused financial companies that are systemically risky.32
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview
of US insurance regulation and the existing literature addressing the prospect that insurance can generate or contribute to
systemic risk. It also describes the key structural changes to US
insurance regulation that result from Dodd-Frank. Part II then
argues that, as a result of common patterns in investment activities, product design, and risk-mitigation strategies, among other factors, entire segments of the insurance industry—in addition to individual “systemically important” insurance-focused
firms—can play an important part in causing or exacerbating
systemic risk. Finally, Part III explores the regulatory implications of these conclusions. It argues that the current system of
state-based insurance regulation is ill suited to identify and
manage systemic risk, and it consequently proposes empowering
the FIO to supplement or preempt state law.

29
30
31
32

See Dodd-Frank § 313, 124 Stat at 1580–88, codified at 31 USC § 313.
See text accompanying notes 112–17.
See Part III.
See Dodd-Frank § 113, 124 Stat at 1398–1402, codified at 12 USC § 5323.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF US INSURANCE REGULATION AND SYSTEMIC
RISK
Prior to 2008, conventional wisdom in regulatory and policy
circles was that the insurance industry posed no meaningful risk
to broader financial stability in the economy.33 Unlike the banking and securities sectors, the insurance industry had never
been a primary, or even secondary, culprit in a broad financial
panic. Insurers’ prominent role in the global crisis of 2008 seemingly undermined this conventional wisdom. But since 2008, the
dominant interpretation of these events—domestically, if not internationally34—has been that they represent a narrowly confined exception to the preexisting conventional wisdom that insurance is not systemically risky. Thus, most academic and
policy analyses of insurance and systemic risk in the United
States argue that only a small category of nontraditional and
noninsurance activities, such as those engaged in by AIG and
the financial-guarantee insurers, can contribute to systemic
risk.35 As a result, the primary change in the regulatory architecture of insurance since 2008 impacts only a small handful of
insurance-focused financial companies that are deemed systemically significant.36
This Part reviews these developments in insurance regulation and academic commentary on insurance and systemic risk
since the crisis. Section A provides a brief overview of statebased insurance regulation and the related view that insurance
does not pose systemic risk. Section B then describes the role of
33 This Article does not purport to define what should be meant by the “insurance
industry” and “insurance.” Instead, the Article’s normative analysis relies on how those
terms are currently viewed.
34 Globally, the regulatory response to systemic risk in insurance has been substantially more robust. Organizing through the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), global policymakers have begun to develop a coordinated and systematic framework for addressing the prospect of
systemic risk in insurance. See, for example, International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Common Framework, online at http://www.iaisweb.org/Common-Framework--765
(visited Nov 3, 2014). As in the United States, this project involves identifying potential
systemically risky insurers and subjecting them to enhanced prudential oversight. But
unlike in the United States, global actors have paired this effort with attempts to develop a new macroprudential approach to insurance regulation that aims to identify and
mitigate systemic risks in insurance that are not confined to individual institutions. See
generally International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Macroprudential Policy
and Surveillance in Insurance (IAIS Working Paper, July 18, 2013), online at
www.iaisweb.org/view/element_href.cfm?src=1/19149.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
35 See Part I.C.
36 See Part I.C.
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AIG, financial-guarantee insurers, and life insurers in the global
financial crisis. Finally, Section C reviews the regulatory and
academic responses to insurers’ role in the crisis.
A.

Pre-crisis US Insurance Regulation: State-Based Consumer
Protection Regulation

Historically, insurance regulation has been the responsibility solely of the individual states rather than the federal government.37 Prior to 1944, this division of responsibilities was understood to be embedded in the US Constitution as a result of an
old Supreme Court case holding that insurance is not “commerce” and hence cannot be regulated by Congress under the
Commerce Clause.38 But in 1944, the Supreme Court reversed
this holding, declaring that insurance was indeed “commerce” under the US Constitution.39 Shortly thereafter, largely as a result of
state and industry lobbying, Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act of 1945.40 The central provisions of that Act declared that the continued regulation of insurance by the states
was in the public interest and that no federal law of general applicability should be interpreted to preempt state laws that regulate “the business of insurance.”41
Since passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, state insurance regulation has grown substantially in its scope and sophistication. Although individual states regulate the business of insurance conducted within their geographic boundaries, they
coordinate extensively through an organization known as the
NAIC.42 This coordination includes drafting model laws and regulations for adoption in the states, synchronizing enforcement
efforts, and monitoring one another to ensure the sufficiency of

37 See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 NYU L Rev 13, 20–26
(1993) (examining the broad regulatory exemption for the “business of insurance”); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 Fla St U L Rev 625, 629–34 (1999)
(showing that state control over insurance was unchallenged from the 1860s until the
New Deal).
38 Paul v Virginia, 75 US 168, 183 (1869) (“Issuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce.”).
39 United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 US 533, 553 (1944).
40 Pub L No 79-15, 59 Stat 33, codified at 15 USC §§ 1011–15.
41 McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2(b), 15 USC § 1012(b).
42 See Randall, 26 Fla St U L Rev at 635–36 (cited in note 37).
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each state’s regulatory authority and resources.43 This last form
of coordination is particularly important because it allows states
to defer to one another when regulation of a single company by
multiple states would be a waste of resources.44
The central goal of state insurance regulation is to protect
consumers from various risks involved with purchasing insurance coverage.45 Accordingly, much state insurance regulation
consists of standard consumer-protection rules: licensing requirements for insurers and agents, product and rate standards,
prohibitions against unfair or misleading advertising, requirements for the fair payment of policyholders’ claims, regulatoroperated complaint hotlines, and (sporadic) disclosure-oriented
rules.46 Commentators occasionally distinguish these standard
consumer-protection insurance rules from solvency regulation,
which attempts to safeguard the financial strength of individual
insurers.47 But the core goal of even solvency regulation has long
been understood to be protecting consumers by ensuring that insurers have the financial capacity to pay policyholder claims
when they become due.48
By contrast, state insurance regulation in general, and state
solvency regulation in particular, is much less commonly justified based on a perceived need to ensure financial stability. The
reason is that it has long been believed that the business of insurance is not systemically risky.49 In other words, according to
conventional wisdom, there is little to no prospect that a shock
to the insurance industry or an individual insurer could trigger
a loss of economic value or confidence in a substantial segment
of the financial system that is serious enough to have significant

43 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation: Cases and Materials
119–22 (Foundation 5th ed 2010).
44 See id at 120–21 (describing the NAIC’s process of accreditation, which allows
insurance regulators to defer to the solvency regulation of an insurer’s state of domicile).
45 See Schwarcz, 94 Minn L Rev at 1735 (cited in note 19); Sharon Tennyson, Rethinking Consumer Protection Regulation in Insurance Markets *5 (Networks Financial
Institute Policy Brief, Mar 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676418 (visited
Nov 3, 2014) (“The primary motivation for consumer protection regulation in insurance
is the idea that consumers in these markets are imperfectly informed about product
characteristics.”).
46 See Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation at 118–19 (cited in note 43).
47 See, for example, Tennyson, Rethinking Consumer Protection at *1 n 2 (cited in
note 45).
48 See Schwarcz, 94 Minn L Rev at 1736 (cited in note 19).
49 See note 19.
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adverse effects on the real economy.50 There are several traditional explanations for this view.
The first and most important rationale for the view that insurance is not systemically risky is that insurers have only limited interconnections with the larger financial system.51 The interconnectedness of financial institutions is one of the central
criteria by which most regulators and analysts assess systemic
risk.52 In the insurance context, there are two ways to view interconnectedness. From one perspective, commentators view the
insurance industry as unrelated to the banking industry and securities markets.53 Consistent with this view, insurance regulation traditionally has been completely separate from banking
and securities regulation.54 Thus, under this view, even the failure of an insurer should not impact the larger financial system.
Another perspective on interconnectedness focuses on maturity transformation: the asset-liability mismatch that results

50 One of us has proposed a more specific definition of systemic risk, which is along
the same lines. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Georgetown L J 193, 204
(2008):

[S]ystemic risk: the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a
chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial
institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.
51 See Geneva Association, Cross Industry Analysis: 28 G-SIBs vs. 28 Insurers:
Comparison of Systemic Risk Indicators *12 (Risk and Insurance Economics Working
Paper, Feb 12, 2013), online at https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/472982/ga2013
-updated_cross%20industry_analysis.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (arguing that insurers are
“much less interconnected” to other financial services than banks). But see National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Financial Institutions Exposure of U.S. Insurance
Company Investments, Capital Markets Special Report (Center for Insurance Policy and
Research), online at http://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/110520.htm (visited
Nov 3, 2014) (commenting on connections between financial institutions and insurance
companies through debt capital markets).
52 Along with size and substitutability, interconnectedness is one of three primary
factors according to the FSB’s criteria. See Financial Stability Board, Guidance to Assess
the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations *9 (Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors, Oct 2009), online at
https://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
53 See, for example, Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 804 (cited in note 8)
(“[I]nsurance markets are fundamentally different from banking. Sensible regulation . . .
should recognize the difference.”).
54 The recent consolidation of insurance and other financial regulation in New York
is evidence that this view is beginning to change. See New York State Department of Financial Services, History, online at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/history.htm (visited Nov 3,
2014).
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from the short-term funding of long-term projects.55 This mismatch—which interlinks short-term lenders with long-term borrowers and creates a liquidity risk that borrowers will be unable
to repay their lenders—was at the core of the financial crisis and
is the central rationale for banking regulation.56 Policymakers
often assume that insurance is not systemically risky because,
historically (and unlike banks and other financial institutions),
insurers did not rely on maturity transformation for funding. Insurers’ funding has traditionally stemmed principally from policyholders’ payment of premiums,57 and that has been widely believed to be a long-term and stable funding source because
policyholders are generally free to withdraw their funding only
on the occurrence of contractually specified events, such as
property destruction or death.58 Insurers have not historically
depended substantially on other financial institutions to sustain,
or even grow, their operations.59 This contrasts sharply with
banking, in which the contractual ability of depositors to withdraw their funds at any time creates the prospect of a potentially contagious run on the banking system.60

55 See Huberto M. Ennis and Todd Keister, Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils
of Intervention, 99 Am Econ Rev 1588, 1590 (2009) (“Money market funds and other arrangements perform maturity transformation by investing in long-term assets while offering investors the ability to withdraw funds on demand.”).
56 See Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System,
2010 Brookings Papers Econ Activity 261, 261–62 (discussing sale and repurchase
agreements in the context of the 2008 financial crisis); Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang,
and Gustavo A. Suarez, The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Market *1 (Finance and Economics Discussion Series Working Paper
No 2009-36, Aug 18, 2009), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/
200936/200936pap.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (arguing that maturity transformation
“played a central role in transforming concerns about the credit quality of mortgagerelated assets into a global financial crisis”).
57 See Federal Insurance Office, Annual Report on the Insurance Industry *13
(June 2013), online at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/
FIO%20Annual%20Report%202013.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (noting that approximately
75 percent of life- and health-insurance-sector revenue is generated from premiums).
58 See Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk and the U.S. Insurance Sector at *18
(cited in note 19).
59 See Kenneth A. Carow, Citicorp–Travelers Group Merger: Challenging Barriers
between Banking and Insurance, 25 J Bank & Fin 1551, 1554–57 (2001) (examining the
still-significant regulatory barriers between banking and insurance at the end of the
twentieth century); Kenneth A. Carow, The Wealth Effects of Allowing Bank Entry into
the Insurance Industry, 68 J Risk & Ins 129, 130–32 (2001) (examining the regulatory
framework that made it difficult for banks to enter the insurance market until the late
1990s).
60 See Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey, and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law
of Banking and Financial Institutions 310 (Aspen 4th ed 2009).
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A second explanation for the view that insurance is not systemically risky derives from the substitutability of insurance,
which is another criterion by which regulators and analysts assess systemic risk. Insurance is usually thought of as less essential to the operation of the macro-economy than other types of
financial services, such as banking. In the life insurance context,
many types of insurance have ready substitutes because they
primarily function as an investment mechanism.61 And although
life insurance is unique in its capacity to provide financial guarantees—particularly in the event of death—such guarantees, it
is generally claimed, are not fundamental to the operation of the
larger economy.62 Similar arguments are often made with respect to property and casualty insurance: disruptions in these
markets, some suggest, may not noticeably impact the larger
macro-economy.63 Indeed, the value of property and casualty insurance to large publicly owned companies is actually a matter
of deep debate, with many arguing that those companies would
be better off not purchasing such insurance.64 In any event,
commentators often claim that any disruptions that do occur
would likely be quite temporary given limited barriers to entry
in the industry and the tendency of capital to migrate to insurance markets when they have become stressed.65
Size, which is another criterion by which regulators and analysts assess systemic risk, constitutes the third basis for the
view that insurance is not systemically risky. By most measures,
insurance is simply not as large as other segments of the financial system, particularly the banking system: insurers in the
United States had about $7.3 trillion of assets on their books in
2012, whereas banks had $14.5 trillion.66 Globally, insurers had

61 See Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk and the U.S. Insurance Sector at *32–33
(cited in note 19).
62 See, for example, id.
63 See generally, for example, Steven N. Weisbart and Robert P. Hartwig, Property/
Casualty Insurance and Systemic Risk (Insurance Information Institute Apr 2011),
online at http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/paper_Systemic%20Risk_042011.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014). This is significant because certain segments of the insurance system
have indeed largely broken down in the past. The most notable examples are the socalled liability-insurance crises of the last several decades. See Tom Baker, The Medical
Malpractice Myth 51–58 (Chicago 2005).
64 See, for example, Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate
Purchase of Insurance, 5 Rev L & Econ 541, 542 (2009).
65 See, for example, Weiss, Systemic Risk and the U.S. Insurance Sector at *27–28
(cited in note 19).
66 FIO, Annual Report at *5 & n 5 (cited in note 57).
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about $22.6 trillion of assets in 2009.67 A substantial percentage
of these assets are attributable to the life insurance industry,
which serves the dual roles of protecting policyholders against
risk and helping policyholders save and invest their assets.68
B.

The Global Financial Crisis and Insurance

The financial crisis of 2008 poses obvious difficulties for the
view that insurance is not systemically risky. This is most visible with respect to the dramatic and massive failure of AIG, a
holding company with numerous subsidiaries engaging in a wide
range of financial-services operations.69 Although many of these
subsidiaries were indeed traditional insurance companies, AIG’s
problems resulted in large part from the activities of a company
that was not licensed as an insurance company: AIG Financial
Products (AIGFP).70
This AIG subsidiary issued an immense number of CDSs to
numerous financial companies. From an economic perspective,
CDSs act much like insurance: in exchange for a premium payment, the protection seller promises to pay the purchaser in the
event of a default or other credit event on an underlying instrument.71 If, during the term of the CDS, a credit event or default
becomes more likely to occur, then the protection seller is typically required to post additional collateral.72 Unlike traditional
insurance, however, there is no need for the purchaser of a CDS
to have an insurable interest in the underlying risk: a company
can purchase a CDS on an underlying instrument even if it does
not own that instrument.73
67 Bank for International Settlements, Fixed Income Strategies of Insurance Companies and Pension Funds *5 (Committee on the Global Financial System Working Paper No 44, July 2011), online at https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs44.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
68 See id at *5–8.
69 See Sjostrom, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev at 945 (cited in note 1).
70 See id at 952–53.
71 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: A Guide to the Principles of Asset
Securitization § 10:3.1 at 14–16 (Practicing Law Institute 3d ed 2002); Hearing to Review
the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy, before the House Committee on Agriculture, 110th Cong, 2d Sess 11 (2008) (statement of Erik R. Sirri, Director, Division of
Trading and Markets, SEC).
72 See Sjostrom, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev at 951 (cited in note 1).
73 See Arthur Kimball-Stanley, Insurance and Credit Default Swaps: Should Like
Things Be Treated Alike?, 15 Conn Ins L J 241, 246–49 (2008) (discussing the arguments
that CDSs are not insurance, including: (1) that CDSs lack an insurable interest requirement and indemnity requirement, (2) that the differing objectives of CDSs and insurance
contracts justify differential treatment, and (3) that “CDS[s] are capital market products
and not insurance”) (quotation marks omitted).
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In the years leading up to 2008, AIGFP wrote a tremendous
number of CDSs on mortgage-backed securities and similar financial instruments that were ultimately linked to homeowners’
mortgage payments.74 For years, this subsidiary produced massive profits for AIG.75 But in the financial crisis, as markets
started to indicate an increased risk of default on mortgagebacked securities and related financial instruments, AIG was
forced to post increasing amounts of collateral and ultimately
amassed staggering debts to its various counterparties.76 Concerned that AIG’s failure to pay these debts to its counterparties
could cause those counterparties to fail and trigger larger financial panic, the US government bailed out AIG by infusing capital
that was used to pay off AIG’s CDS counterparties in full.77
Although AIG’s largest problems stemmed from its CDS business, it also experienced major stresses related to its securitieslending program, which more directly involved its insurance entities. Coordinating through a noninsurer AIG affiliate, AIG’s
insurers lent their securities to other firms on a short-term basis
in exchange for fees.78 Borrowers of those securities were required
to post cash collateral, but they were entitled to have that collateral returned to them if they returned the borrowed securities.79
As AIG began to experience financial turmoil, borrowers of the
74 At year-end 2007, AIGFP’s CDS exposure was $533 billion (net notional value).
Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 790 (cited in note 8). Of this, $78 billion (net notional value) were in multisector CDOs. Id at 791. AIGFP’s multisector collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were written on “super senior” tranches of asset-backed securities, which
included pools of assets of residential mortgage-backed securities, commercial mortgagebacked securities, and CDOs. Of the $78 billion, $61 billion were exposed to subprime
mortgages. Id; Sjostrom, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev at 959 (cited in note 1).
75 A former AIGFP senior executive “characterized writing CDSs as ‘gold’ and ‘free
money’ because AIGFP’s risk models indicated that the underlying securities would never go into default.” Sjostrom, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev at 957 (cited in note 1).
76 As a consequence of the housing-market collapse, AIGFP ceased writing new
multisector CDSs in 2005, and in 2007 and 2008, AIGFP was required to post additional
collateral in compliance with its multisector CDO contracts. Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins
at 791 (cited in note 8); Sjostrom, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev at 960–61 (cited in note 1). By
the end of August 2008, AIGFP posted about $20 billion of additional collateral for its
CDS portfolio. Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 790 (cited in note 8). And during the summer of 2008, for example, AIGFP was required to post $6 billion in additional collateral,
equivalent to 34 percent of the cash and cash equivalents that AIG had available to meet
the cash needs of its operations. Sjostrom, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev at 960–61 (cited in note 1).
77 See Sjostrom, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev at 963–75 (cited in note 1).
78 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Securities Lending in the
Insurance Industry, Capital Markets Special Report (Center for Insurance Policy and
Research), online at http://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/110708.htm (visited
Nov 3, 2014); Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 791–93 (cited in note 8).
79 See Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 791 (cited in note 8).
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firm’s securities availed themselves of this substitution option
en masse, worried about their cash collateral not being returned
by AIG.80 This, in turn, created dramatic and unanticipated liquidity needs for AIG, which had invested about 60 percent of
the cash collateral it had received from securities borrowers in
the very mortgage-backed securities whose value was precipitously declining.81
AIG’s bailout was not the only way in which insurers contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. In fact, financial-guarantee
insurers also played a substantial role in the financial crisis.
Financial-guarantee insurers are one type of monoline insurer:
their business is in a single (that is, mono) line of insurance
precisely because it is different in kind, and riskier, than other
types of insurance.82 Originally, monoline financial-guarantee
insurance covered the risk that municipal bonds would default.83
But in recent decades, financial-guarantee insurers expanded
this coverage to the then-rapidly growing securitization markets,84 which offered numerous transactions to insure.85 Such
coverage was generally purchased by the issuer of a covered security, which helped increase investor appetite for these instruments by limiting the financial consequences of default to the
investor.86 In fact, financial-guarantee insurance supported

80

See id at 791–92.
See American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation, Hearing before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong, 1st Sess 56–59 (2009) (“Dinallo Testimony”) (statement of Eric Dinallo, Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department).
82 See Subcommittee on Financial Guarantee Instrumentation of the Committee on
Developments in Business Financing, NAIC Model Act on Financial Guaranty Insurance:
A Commentary, 43 Bus Law 717, 718 (1988) (noting that the NAIC chooses to require
monoline insurance to handle increased risk).
83 See Wells Fargo, Deterioration of Monoline Insurance Companies and the Repercussions for Municipal Bonds *2–3 (Wells Fargo Funds Management 2008), online at
http://www.wellsfargoadvantagefunds.com/pdf/whitepapers/monoline_insurance_muni
_bonds.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
84 See National Australia Bank, Monolines Deserve a Good Wrap *3 (National Australia Capital Markets Apr 2001), online at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/nabl
_mono_0402.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (explaining that financial-guarantee insurance policies issued by monolines offer “an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee” of the timely payment—according to their original maturities—of principal and interest to investors
holding insured securities).
85 See Wells Fargo, Deterioration of Monoline Insurance Companies at *5 (cited in
note 83) (“For the monolines, the lure of the [securitization] market was too great to
ignore.”).
86 See National Australia Bank, Monolines Deserve a Good Wrap at *13 (cited in
note 84):
81
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much of the $330 billion market for auction-rate securities
(ARSs), which are long-term debt securities with short-term resetting interest rates issued by municipalities, museums,
schools, and similar entities.87 In February 2008, the ARS market came to a halt because investors feared that monolines could
not be counted on to pay their insurance.88 As the fear became
contagious, investors started avoiding all ARSs, even those of
strong issuers.89
Like AIG, then, financial-guarantee insurers “insured” policyholders against the risk that financial instruments linked to
the housing market would default. Unlike AIG, however, the
companies that issued these products were explicitly regulated
as insurers.90 At the same time, one of the primary reasons that
financial-guarantee insurers are required to be monolines is that
state regulators have long understood that this type of insurance is inherently riskier than other forms of insurance.91 By
forcing insurers that sold this type of coverage to refrain from expanding into more traditional forms of insurance, state regulators
may have limited the exposure of most of the insurance industry
to this risk.92

Monolines adhere strictly to a no-loss underwriting strategy. . . . The no-loss
underwriting indicates that every deal needs to demonstrate full collectivity
before the monoline will even consider wrapping the deal. As such the monolines implement stringent internal credit criteria. The no-loss underwriting
strategy embraced by the monolines is tested against worst-case stress scenarios which help insure a zero rate of expected portfolio losses.
See also Standard & Poor’s, Global Bond Insurance 2006 10 (Standard & Poor’s 2006)
(discussing the importance of the monolines’ underwriting quality).
87 Christine Munroe, The Auction Rate Securities Market *16 (Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association Apr 2008), online at http://www.sifma.org/research/
item.aspx?id=21473 (visited Nov 3, 2014); The State of the Bond Insurance Industry,
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government
Sponsored Enterprises of the House Committee on Financial Services, 110th Cong, 2d
Sess 39 (2008) (statement of Erik R. Sirri, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, US
SEC); Liz Rappaport and Kara Scannell, Credit Crunch: Auction-Rate Turmoil Draws
Watchdogs’ Scrutiny, Wall St J C2 (Feb 22, 2008).
88 Wells Fargo, Deterioration of Monoline Insurance at *8 (cited in note 83).
89 See Ted Phillips, Moody’s Warns of Negative Impacts from Auction-Rate Securities, Bond Buyer 4 (Feb 21, 2008) (observing that failed auctions are “occurring in spite
of the fact that the underlying credit quality of issuers remains strong”) (quotation
marks omitted).
90 See Dwight M. Jaffee, Monoline Regulations to Control the Systemic Risk Created
by Investment Banks and GSEs, 9 BE J Econ Analysis & Pol *10–11 (2009).
91 See id.
92 See id.
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Additionally, many traditional insurers—particularly life
insurers—did indeed experience substantial capital deterioration during the financial crisis.93 This resulted from both sharp
decreases in net income and dramatic increases in unrealized
losses on investment assets in 2008.94 These capital shortfalls
led insurers to apply for federal bailout funds,95 to seek changes
to accounting rules in order to provide capital relief,96 to sell insurance policies for less than their actual economic cost,97 and to
receive capital infusions from their affiliate noninsurance companies.98 Life insurers with large portfolios of variable annuities
with guaranteed lifetime benefits were particularly hard-hit, because they had to increase their reserves in response to declines
in equity markets.99
Ultimately, as emphasized by a recent GAO report, both life
insurers’ capital cushions and their income rebounded quickly.
By 2009 their capital levels and income had improved significantly, and by 2011 their investment portfolios had also largely
rebounded.100 Moreover, throughout the financial crisis, very few
life insurers failed: in 2008, consistent with historical trends, six
life insurers were placed into receivership and three insurers
were liquidated.101 Although 2009 saw increases in these numbers,
rates of insurer failures fell below historical trends in 2010,
when only four were placed into receivership and three were
liquidated.102
93

See GAO Report at *10–17 (cited in note 7).
See id at *10 (noting that life insurers’ net income decreased from $31.9 billion in
2007 to a loss of $52.2 billion in 2008); id at *11 (noting that total unrealized losses
amounted to $63.8 billion in 2008, and, as a result, total capital declined 6 percent in the
life insurance industry in 2008).
95 See Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 788 (cited in note 8) (“Six insurers applied for
and were authorized to receive TARP funds.”).
96 See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Ratings in Insurance Regulation: The Missing
Piece of Financial Reform, 68 Wash & Lee L Rev 1667, 1689–94 (2011) (detailing regulators’ strategy of capital relief, whereby they relaxed the capital requirements imposed on
insurance companies).
97 See Ralph S.J. Koijen and Motohiro Yogo, The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life
Insurers *2–3 (Chicago Booth Research Paper No 12-30, Apr 15, 2013), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031993 (visited Nov 3, 2014).
98 See Gregory Niehaus, Managing Capital and Insolvency Risk via Internal Capital Market Transactions: The Case of Life Insurers *11–12 (working paper, Feb 2, 2014),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2429024 (visited Nov 3, 2014).
99 See GAO Report at *28–29 (cited in note 7).
100 See id at *12 (noting that life insurers’ capital increased by 15 percent from 2008
to 2009).
101 Id at *17.
102 Id.
94
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The Post-crisis Regulatory Landscape: Federal Regulation
of “Systemically Important” Nonbank Financial Companies

In 2010, Congress passed Dodd-Frank to reform financial
regulation in light of the financial crisis.103 Not surprisingly,
Dodd-Frank contained some reforms of state insurance regulation. The most important of these creates and empowers FSOC
to designate insurance-focused financial companies, as well as
other nonbank financial companies, as Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Such a designation subjects the
SIFI to an additional layer of prudential supervision by the Fed,
including enhanced capital requirements, regular stress testing,
and various reporting and governance requirements.104 DoddFrank also subjects insurance-focused financial firms to federal
scrutiny if they are themselves a savings-and-loan depository
institution or own such an institution.105
FSOC has released complex regulations detailing its methodology for identifying nonbank financial companies as SIFIs. These
rules establish an initial group of potential SIFIs by starting with
firms with more than $50 billion in total worldwide consolidated
assets that also meet one of five quantitative tests relating to
their derivative liabilities, aggregate debt, leverage, reliance on
short-term debt, and status as a reference entity in CDSs.106 To
date, FSOC has designated only three insurance-focused financial
companies—AIG, Prudential, and MetLife—as SIFIs.107 Although
AIG accepted this designation, both Prudential and MetLife have
vigorously opposed it, arguing that, despite their size, they do not
engage in any of the nontraditional insurance or noninsurance activities that create systemic risk.108 Prudential ultimately lost this
appeal to FSOC and did not seek judicial review of the decision.109
Notably, both members of the council with expertise in insurance

103

Dodd-Frank, 124 Stat at 1376.
Dodd-Frank § 113, 124 Stat at 1398–1402, codified at 12 USC § 5323 (setting criteria for when nonbank firms, including insurers, should be designated SIFIs).
105 Dodd-Frank § 312, 124 Stat at 1521–23, codified at 12 USC § 5412.
106 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, Authority to Require Supervision and
Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed Reg 21637, 21661 (2012)
(amending 12 CFR § 1310).
107 See note 5 and accompanying text.
108 See Michael R. Crittenden and Leslie Scism, Global Finance: Prudential Hits
Back on Risk Status, Wall St J C3 (July 22, 2013).
109 Sarah N. Lynch, Prudential Says It Will Not Appeal U.S. Council’s Systemic Tag
(Reuters Oct 18, 2013), online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/us-prudential
-fsoc-idUSBRE99H11620131018 (visited Nov 3, 2014).
104
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dissented from this determination.110 Meanwhile, MetLife’s challenge to its SIFI designation is ongoing as of October 2014.111
In addition to subjecting certain insurance-focused nonbank financial firms to federal regulation, Dodd-Frank created
the FIO within the Treasury Department.112 The FIO has no
regulatory authority over the insurance industry.113 Instead, the
FIO’s principal role is to serve as a federal monitor of the insurance industry and state regulation and to “coordinate Federal
efforts and develop Federal policy on prudential aspects of international insurance matters.”114 Dodd-Frank directs the FIO to
“monitor all aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the
United States financial system.”115 It also directs the FIO to
“conduct a study and submit a report to Congress on how to
modernize and improve the system of insurance regulation in
the United States.”116 In December 2013, the FIO released this report, which concluded that state insurance regulation must occasionally be supplemented by federal intervention in specific areas
in which state regulation proves unduly ineffective or inefficient.117
Although important, these reforms of insurance law and
regulation leave the state-based system of insurance regulation
essentially unchanged for all but the small number of insurancefocused financial firms that FSOC deems systemically significant or that own (or are) a savings-and-loan depository institution. Defenders of state insurance regulation argue that this is
appropriate, emphasizing that AIGFP would never have been allowed to write the CDSs that it did if it had been regulated as an
insurance company.118 Indeed, it was a federal statute—the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000119—that explicitly
110 See Zachary Tracer and Ian Katz, Prudential Financial Got Systemic Risk Label
in 7-2 Vote, Bloomberg Personal Finance (Bloomberg Sept 20, 2013), online at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-20/prudential-financial-got-u-s-systemic-risk-label
-in-7-2-vote.html (visited Nov 3, 2014).
111 See note 5.
112 See notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
113 See Dodd-Frank § 313, 124 Stat at 1580–88, codified at 31 USC § 313.
114 Dodd-Frank § 313(c)(1)(E), 124 Stat at 1581, codified at 31 USC § 313(c)(1)(E).
115 Dodd-Frank § 313(c)(1)(A), 124 Stat at 1580, codified at 31 USC § 313(c)(1)(A).
116 Dodd-Frank § 313(p)(1), 124 Stat at 1585, codified at 31 USC § 313(p)(1).
117 See FIO, Annual Report at *39–42 (cited in note 57) (discussing regulatory developments at the state and federal levels).
118 See, for example, Dinallo Testimony, 111th Cong, 1st Sess at 57 (cited in note 81).
119 Pub L No 106-554, 114 Stat 2763A-365.
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exempted derivatives such as CDSs from insurance regulation in
the first place.120 And it was a federal agency—the Office of
Thrift Supervision—that was the overarching regulator of AIG
as a holding company.121 Moreover, while most proponents of
state insurance regulation now acknowledge that regulation of
financial-guarantee insurance was indeed flawed,122 they emphasize that the very fact that these insurers were required to
be monolines limited the resulting damage.123 Finally, as described earlier, while many life insurers did indeed experience
substantial capital shortfalls in the midst of the crisis, remarkably few insurers actually failed as a result.124
Closely related to these defenses of state insurance regulation in the midst of the crisis are various industry and academic
assessments concluding that traditional insurance activities are
not systemically risky, for many of the basic reasons outlined

120 See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the
“Business of Banking,” 63 U Miami L Rev 1041, 1043 & n 3 (2009) (noting that some critics blame the financial crisis on deregulatory legislation such as the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act).
121 See Dinallo Testimony, 111th Cong, 1st Sess at 57 (cited in note 81); The Federal
Insurance Office’s Report on Modernizing Insurance Regulation, Hearing before Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance of the House Committee on Financial Services *2
(“Leonardi Testimony”) (statement of Thomas B. Leonardi, Insurance Commissioner,
State of Connecticut), online at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113
-ba04-wstate-tleonardi-20140204.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (emphasizing that simply federalizing regulation does not improve matters, as federal regulators were responsible for
failures in the 2008 crisis).
122 See, for example, Ana Carvajal, et al, The Perimeter of Financial Regulation *4
(International Monetary Fund Mar 26, 2009), online at https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0907.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
123 See, for example, Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 788 (cited in note 8). For arguments that monoline requirements limit damage, see Dwight Jaffee, Monoline Restrictions, with Applications to Mortgage Insurance and Title Insurance, 28 Rev Indust
Org 83, 106 (2006) (claiming that a monoline requirement segregates risk, provides a
useful structure for controlling conflicts of interest, and imposes higher capital requirements); Jaffee, 9 BE J Econ Analysis & Pol at *10–11 (cited in note 90) (presenting monoline regulation as a way to deal with insurance risk).
124 See International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Insurance and Financial
Stability *3 (Nov 2011), online at http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Insurance_and
_financial_stability.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (“The financial crisis of 2008/09 has shown
that, in general, the insurance business model enabled the majority of insurers to withstand the financial crisis better than other financial institutions.”); Michelle Brennan,
Rodney A. Clark, and Michael J. Vine, What May Cause Insurance Companies to Fail—
And How This Influences Our Criteria *4 (Standard & Poor’s RatingsDirect June 13,
2013), online at http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_EMEA/2013
-06-13_WhatMayCauseInsuranceCompaniesToFail.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (“Perhaps
surprisingly, the global financial crisis that began in 2007 failed to trigger a wave of life
and non-life insurer defaults among rated companies.”).
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above.125 But even proponents of the view that insurance is not
generally systemically risky admit that this conclusion does not
apply to nontraditional insurance or noninsurance activities.126
It is precisely such activities, they claim, that characterize the
roles of AIG and financial-guarantee insurers in the crisis.127
Both CDSs and financial-guarantee insurance for exotic structured securities are nontraditional or noninsurance products because they directly insure financial-market activities instead of
property, mortality, longevity, or casualty risks.128 The specific
type of securities-lending operations engaged in by AIG are also
sometimes described as nontraditional.
Even after the crisis, insurers and their affiliates do, in fact,
continue to participate in this set of activities that are labeled as
nontraditional or noninsurance.129 For instance, insurers and
their affiliates have continued writing substantial amounts of
CDSs. One recent analysis concluded that insurers held approximately $270 billion in outstanding CDSs globally in 2010.130
Domestically, the notional value of CDSs held by the insurance
industry as of year-end 2011 was $45.1 billion—a 6.8 percent increase from year-end 2010.131 It is unclear whether these numbers include the CDS activities of insurance entities’ affiliates.
According to at least one source, CDSs are written more often by
insurer affiliates—as in the case of AIG—than by insurers directly.132 Life insurers also continue to be active lenders of securities.
125

See Part I.A.
See, for example, Harrington, 76 J Risk & Ins at 788 (cited in note 8); Geneva Association, Systemic Risk in Insurance: An Analysis of Insurance and Financial Stability *3
(Risk and Insurance Economics Working Paper, Mar 2010), online at https://www.allianz.com/
v_1339671717000/media/responsibility/documents/geneva_association_report_on_systemic
_risk_in_insurance.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
127 See Geneva Association, Systemic Risk in Insurance at *20 (cited in note 126)
(blaming insurance difficulties that arose during the crisis on “non-insurance activities”).
128 See id at *58–63 (explaining the workings of financial-guarantee insurance
and CDSs).
129 See Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk and the U.S. Insurance Sector at *37
(cited in note 19) (“[I]nsurers have remained active in the CDS market even after the
AIG debacle.”).
130 Id at *36–37.
131 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, An Update of the Insurance
Industry’s Derivatives Exposure, Capital Markets Special Report (Center for Insurance
Policy Research), online at http://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/130109.htm
(visited Nov 3, 2014).
132 See Nadège Jassaud and Sebastian Schich, Credit Default Swaps: Towards
Tighter Regulation of the ‘Shadow Insurance Sector,’ in Patrick M. Liedtke and Jan
Monkiewicz, eds, The Future of Insurance Regulation and Supervision: A Global Perspective 162, 170–72 (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).
126
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As of 2011, for instance, the insurance industry had lent out $56
billion under securities-lending agreements, with life insurers
accounting for about 83 percent of this activity.133 By contrast,
the market for financial-guarantee insurance has largely dissipated since the crisis.134
Additionally, new quantitative approaches that attempt to
measure the systemic risk associated with particular segments
of the economy suggest that there are important interconnections between the insurance industry and the rest of the financial system.135 Some of the most helpful such approaches attempt
to identify correlations among historical stock prices or failure
rates between the identified sector and other financial firms.136
Although the studies have produced mixed findings regarding
the systemic risk associated with the insurance industry, many
do find substantial interconnections between insurers and other
types of financial institutions.137 But interpretation of these results has tended to depend on commentators’ preexisting assessments of systemic risk in insurance. Thus, those who view
traditional insurance activities as not being systemically risky
attribute these results to insurers engaging in noninsurance or
nontraditional activities, particularly the issuance of CDSs.138

133

NAIC, Securities Lending (cited in note 78).
See David S. Veno and Marc Cohen, U.S. Bond Insurers and the Financial Guarantee Sector Stand at a Crossroads *3 (Standard & Poor’s RatingsDirect Mar 19, 2014),
online at http://www.nationalpfg.com/pdf/RatingAgencyReports/BI_Industry_Outlook
_2014_3_19.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
135 For an overview of this literature, see generally Dimitrios Bisias, et al, A Survey
of Systemic Risk Analytics (Office of Financial Research Working Paper No 0001, Jan 5,
2012), online at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRwp0001
_BisiasFloodLoValavanis_ASurveyOfSystemicRiskAnalytics.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
136 See, for example, Viral V. Acharya, et al, Measuring Systemic Risk *17 (AFA
2011 Denver Meetings Working Paper, May 2010), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573171 (visited Nov 3, 2014) (developing marginal expected
shortfall as an econometric measure based on “the average return on any given firm”
during “the 5% worst days for the market”).
137 See, for example, Monica Billio, et al, Econometric Measures of Connectedness
and Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors, 104 J Fin Econ 535, 536 (2012)
(finding increasing interconnectedness between financial institutions, including insurers,
from 2001 to 2008 based on principal-components analysis and Granger-causality networks); Faisal Baluch, Stanley Mutenga, and Chris Parsons, Insurance, Systemic Risk
and the Financial Crisis, 36 Geneva Papers 126, 134 (2011) (finding a significant correlation between banking and insurance stocks that increases during crisis, at least in Europe). See also Acharya, et al, Measuring Systemic Risk at *46 (cited in note 136) (finding
that several insurers have high marginal expected shortfall).
138 See, for example, Billio, et al, 104 J Fin Econ at 536 (cited in note 137).
134
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II. SYSTEMIC RISK IN INSURANCE RESULTING FROM
CORRELATIONS AMONG FIRMS
As Part I suggests, there is an emerging consensus that certain nontraditional forms of insurance and noninsurance activities, such as derivatives trading and financial-guarantee insurance, can contribute to systemic risk. In this Part, we argue that
this is hardly the whole story. Instead, we suggest that the connections between the insurance industry and the larger financial
system are deep, pervasive, and most importantly, constantly
evolving. At the same time, we argue that the insurance industry itself is susceptible to tail end, catastrophic risk. Both of
these potential precursors to systemic risk, we emphasize, can
span individual companies and industry segments due to correlations in companies’ products, risk-management techniques,
investment strategies, and counterparties. As a result, systemic
risk in the insurance industry can arise outside of an individual,
too-big-to-fail firm.
Although certain of these correlations are shown to result,
directly or indirectly, from government regulation, that does not
make the correlations any less important or real, nor does it
mean that less regulation is inherently better. Insurance is a
critical financial industry that closely impacts consumers as policyholders; appropriate regulation is therefore necessary. Some
of that regulation, inadvertently, can cause correlations in insurer behavior that can trigger systemic risk.
A.

Interconnections between Insurers and the Larger Financial
System

As described above, most commentators agree that the insurance industry can indeed have important linkages with the
rest of the financial system to the extent that it engages in nontraditional or noninsurance activities.139 These are generally described to include the provision of financial-guarantee insurance;
participation in derivatives markets, particularly as writers of
credit default swaps; and, in some cases, securities-lending
operations. At least in the latter two instances, the involvement
of insurers and their affiliates in these nontraditional or noninsurance activities appears to continue to be significant.140 This
Section, however, shows that this narrow set of nontraditional or
139
140

See text accompanying notes 124–33.
See text accompanying notes 128–33.
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noninsurance activities, which most clearly contributed to the
last crisis, hardly exhausts the list of actual or potential interconnections between the insurance industry and the rest of the
financial system.
1. The central connection between insurers and the rest of
the financial system: insurers as owners of financial
assets.
Most discussions of systemic risk in insurance overlook or
downplay the most important linkage between the insurance
sector and the rest of the financial system when it comes to assessing systemic risk.141 This linkage involves the industry’s position as a major owner of financial assets.142 The business of insurance requires taking in policyholder premiums and, at some
later point in time, paying those premiums back to policyholders
if an insured event occurs. As a result, insurers—and life insurers, in particular—are among the most important investors in
financial securities in the entire financial system.143 In fact, insurance companies are the largest institutional investors in debt
securities—a market that is not only much larger than the
market for equity securities but also the primary source of corporate financing.144 Insurers own approximately one-third of all
141 See, for example, Geneva Association, Systemic Risk in Insurance at *63 (cited in
note 126) (concluding that typical insurance activities do not pose systemic risk); Cummins
and Weiss, Systemic Risk at *31–39 (cited in note 19). But see Viral V. Acharya, et al, On
the Financial Regulation of Insurance Companies *10 (NYU Stern School of Business
Working Paper, 2009), online at http://web-docs.stern.nyu.edu/salomon/docs/
whitepaper.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (arguing that insurers may be more systemically
risky than commercial banks because of the interaction between insurer downgrades and
investments); Robert F. Weber, Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-risk Management Approach to Principles-Based
Reserving, 8 Berkeley Bus L J 35, 53 (2011) (noting that the failure of a life insurer can
trigger an asset fire sale, which can, in turn, “contribut[e] to other fire sales in other corners of the market, in which case the effects of an insolvent insurer’s sell-off are likely to
be unpredictable”).
142 See Acharya, et al, Financial Regulation of Insurance Companies at *11 (cited in
note 141); National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Update on Insurance Industry Investment Portfolio Asset Mixes (2013), online at http://www.naic.org/capital
_markets_archive/130924.htm (visited Nov 3, 2014) (noting that insurance companies
own assets worth more than $5 trillion).
143 This role is particularly central for life insurance companies because the time
period between payment of premiums and payout of claims is often quite long. See NAIC,
Update on Insurance Industry (cited in note 142) (showing that life insurers held over 60
percent of the assets of the insurance industry in 2013).
144 See Samuel C. Weaver and J. Fred Weston, Strategic Financial Management:
Applications of Corporate Finance 463–69 (Thomson 2008). See also Federal Reserve
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investment-grade bonds145 and, collectively, own almost twice as
much in foreign, corporate, and municipal bonds than do
banks.146 Insurers’ holdings of corporate and foreign bonds exceed those of mutual funds and pension funds combined.147
Insurers’ collective role as primary purchasers of financial
securities might not be systemically noteworthy were it not for
the fact that their investment decisions—including what types
of securities to invest in and when to offload securities from
their books—are, in many cases, deeply correlated with one another.148 There are several explanations for these correlations.
First, the business models of many insurers tend to favor certain
types of securities. For instance, because life insurers’ liabilities
are very long-term, such insurers tend to invest heavily in longterm assets to attempt to limit asset-liability mismatch.149 Second, insurers generally face a complex array of regulatory rules
that impact their investment strategies, including risk-based
capital rules and investment restrictions.150 Although these rules
are designed to ensure that insurers are able to pay their obligations as they come due, the rules have the side effect of producing
similarities in insurers’ investment portfolios and decisions.151
Bank of San Francisco, What Are the Differences between Debt and Equity Markets? (Oct
2005), online at http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2005/october/
debt-equity-market (visited Nov 3, 2014) (observing that although “the average person is
much more aware of the equity (stock) market than of the debt market[,] [ ] the debt
market is the much larger of the two”).
145 See Paul Schultz, Corporate Bond Trading Costs: A Peek Behind the Curtain, 56
J Fin 677, 679 (2001).
146 See Hunt, 68 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1669 (cited in note 96).
147 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the
United States: Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts
Historical Tables 2005–2013 *94 (Mar 6, 2014), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/z1/current/annuals/a2005-2013.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
148 FSOC’s decision designating Prudential as a SIFI acknowledged this very point,
noting that “[t]he severity of the disruption caused by a forced liquidation of Prudential’s
assets could be amplified by the fact that the investment portfolios of many large insurance companies are composed of similar assets.” Financial Stability Oversight Council,
Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Final Determination Regarding
Prudential Financial, Inc *3 (Sept 19, 2013), online at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
fsoc/designations/Documents/Prudential%20Financial%20Inc.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
149 See Anthony Saunders and Marcia Millon Cornett, Financial Institutions Management: A Risk Management Approach 83–84 (McGraw-Hill 7th ed 2011).
150 See Robert W. Klein, A Regulator’s Introduction to the Insurance Industry 140–
49 (NAIC 2d ed 2005).
151 See Whitehead, 96 Cornell L Rev at 346 (cited in note 16); Ayres and Mitts, Antiherding at *29 (cited in note 12) (“[R]educing insolvency-derived systemic risk necessitates prudential regulation aimed specifically at preventing conditional synchronization
in financial institutions’ outcomes.”).
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This is particularly true because these regulations often incorporate the ratings of private rating agencies, even after DoddFrank (which failed to alter the dependence of state insurance
regulation on credit ratings).152 As a result, approximately 80 percent of bonds and preferred stocks held by insurers are tied to
those credit ratings153—a correlation that may well increase systemic risk. Third, insurers carefully safeguard their own financialstrength ratings, which are produced by a small handful of rating agencies that use similar techniques for assessing financial
strength.154 These rating agencies themselves piggyback off of
state risk-based capital (“RBC”) rules, generally expecting carriers to maintain about 350 percent of required RBC.155
Insurers’ coordination of their investment strategies, when
combined with their massive collective role as investors, can
have potentially destructive consequences from a systemic risk
perspective.156 These potential systemic consequences can be divided into two broad categories: (a) market distortions associated with insurers’ purchasing patterns for securities and (b) market distortions associated with insurers’ sale of or sudden
decreased demand for securities.
a) Market distortions from insurers’ buying patterns. Insurers’ coordinated investment activity can pose systemic risks
by inflating asset bubbles and misallocating capital.157 In fact,
emerging evidence suggests that life insurers played an important role in fueling the pre-crisis bubble in structured-finance
152 See Hunt, 68 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1672–75 (cited in note 96) (discussing setting
capital requirements based on asset credit rating). Thus, under the law of virtually every
state, insurers are free to rely on ratings given by rating agencies for any bonds or preferred stocks in their portfolio.
153 Id at 1675. Because insurers are such large investors, rating agencies continue to
enjoy what amounts to a special regulatory privilege, which arguably blunts their incentive to provide accurate ratings and may additionally increase systemic risk. See id at
1686.
154 See generally Steven W. Pottier and David W. Summers, Property-Liability Insurer Financial Strength Ratings: Differences across Rating Agencies, 66 J Risk & Ins
621 (1999) (noting that while ratings agencies use distinct models for rating insurers,
these agencies tend to focus on insurers’ insolvency risk).
155 See Letter from H. Rodgin Cohen, Senior Chairman of Sullivan & Cromwell to Ricardo Anzaldua, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of MetLife, Inc, *2 n 5 (May
20, 2013), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2013/May/20130523/R-1438/R
-1438_052313_111291_554506713029_1.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014). See generally Letter from
Members of Congress to Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Dec 11, 2012), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2013/May/
20130529/R-1442/R-1442_122112_110929_430365578957_1.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
156 See Whitehead, 96 Cornell L Rev at 347–52 (cited in note 16).
157 See id at 327.
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securities linked to the housing market.158 By any measure, insurers are important purchasers of mortgage-backed securities:
by 2007, life insurers held approximately $470 billion in these
securities.159 Their current holdings of these mortgage-backed
securities amount to almost $500 billion.160
Not only are insurers major investors in structured securities linked to the housing market, but their demand for these securities increased by about 55 percent in the four years preceding the crisis.161 Life insurers’ increased demand for these
instruments was driven primarily by a subset of carriers that
had issued products with embedded interest-rate guarantees—
mostly guaranteed-annuity products.162 These carriers faced
substantial unrealized losses during this period due to the unexpectedly low interest-rate environment. Seeking to offset these
potential losses, these life insurers increased their holdings in
mortgage-backed securities that offered higher returns than
high-grade corporate bonds. Because regulators and rating
agencies treated investments in mortgage-backed securities as
largely riskless, insurers were able to increase their return
while facing no consequences in terms of their RBC requirements or ratings.163
Life insurers in general, and particularly life insurers with
heavy unrealized losses stemming from guaranteed annuities,
were thus partially responsible for fueling the demand for
structured-finance securities.164 In doing so, they played an important role in the 2008 global financial crisis. The explosion in
158

See Merrill, Nadauld, and Strahan, Final Demand at *18–19 (cited in note 22).
Id at *19. The authors report that this amounts to about 25 percent of the total
market. Id at *2. But our own estimates suggest that this more likely represented approximately 5 percent, not 25 percent, of the total market. Nonetheless, $470 billion is
such a large amount of mortgage-backed securities that a coordinated sale by insurers
could well trigger the beginning of a market-price collapse.
160 Robert McMenamin, What Do U.S. Life Insurers Invest In? *2 (Chicago Fed Letter No 309, Apr 2013), online at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/
chicago_fed_letter/2013/cflapril2013_309.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
161 Merrill, Nadauld, and Strahan, Final Demand at *19 (cited in note 22).
162 See id at *15–16.
163 See id at *30. This is made most evident by the fact that the life insurers that
increased their exposures to these instruments were also the ones that were the most
capital constrained. See id.
164 See id at *6 (cited in note 22) (“Together with the existing literature, our study
suggests that the structured finance market was fueled both by supply-side distortions
encouraging financial institutions to sell assets and demand-side distortions encouraging
other financial institutions to buy those assets.”); id at *29–30 (“Although issuance of
ABS generated substantial fees for the banks, it is unlikely that issuance could have occurred at the rates observed without strong demand from final investors.”).
159
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structured-finance securities linked to the housing market has
been blamed for indirectly helping to stoke the pre-crisis housing bubble.165 Facing substantial demand to originate mortgages
so that they could be packaged together and securitized, banks
and other mortgage originators increasingly loosened credit
standards, allowing more and more people to buy houses with
loans that they ultimately could not afford. The resulting collapse in the housing market was the key trigger of the financial
crisis writ large.166
Although insurers’ role in inflating a bubble in mortgagebacked securities was clearly directly linked to the 2008 crisis,
insurers’ investments in corporate-debt markets raise potentially bigger systemic risks of capital market distortions. As with
mortgage-backed securities, insurers in general, and particularly those that are capital constrained, appear to consistently
“reach for yield” in their investments in corporate bonds. In other words, they invest in the riskiest—and highest yielding—
corporate debt within the categories of these securities that regulators and rating agencies define to be relatively low risk.167
The result is a broad distortion in the allocation of capital to the
private sector, with corporations tending to issue riskier assets
when insurance companies reach for yield.
Such distortions in capital market funding can directly amplify systemic risk by contributing to procyclical build-ups in the
holding of high-yield, risky assets. Indeed, according to Fed
Chairwoman Janet Yellen, “reaching for yield” was a core factor contributing to the build-up of highly leveraged forms of
mortgage-backed securities that preceded the 2008 financial
crisis.168 More generally, she has observed, the reaching-for-yield
“dynamic has the potential to facilitate the emergence of financial
imbalances . . . [such as] investors holding assets which entail
165 See, for example, Merrill, Nadauld, and Strahan, Final Demand at *6 (cited in
note 22).
166 See National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in
the United States, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report *113–15, 233–42 (2011), online at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
167 See Bo Becker and Victoria Ivashina, Reaching for Yield in the Bond Market *2
(Harvard Business School Working Paper No 12-103, May 2012), online at http://dash
.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9056486/12-103.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
168 See id at *7, citing Janet Yellen, Remarks at the International Conference: Real
and Financial Linkage and Monetary Policy, Bank of Japan (Federal Reserve June 1,
2011), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110601a.pdf
(visited Nov 3, 2014); Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still
Threaten the World Economy (Princeton 2010).
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exposure to greater credit risk [while] not fully appreciat[ing], or
demand[ing] proper compensation for, potential losses.”169 As a
result, reaching for yield has significant potential to increase investment losses during a subsequent downturn.170
Insurers, in sum, play a crucial role in financial markets by
virtue of the assets that they choose to purchase. These decisions are impacted by factors that often affect wide swaths of the
industry, including regulatory capital rules, assessments of rating agencies, losses in commonly sold products, and perceived or
actual constraints in available capital. And, collectively, these
demand-side decisions can have systemic consequences by inflating asset bubbles and misallocating credit in crucial financial
markets.
A crucial, and largely overlooked, point regarding these interconnections between insurers and the rest of the financial
system is that insurers’ potential to stoke systemic risk through
their demand for securities need not involve mass failures or
near failures of numerous insurers. A dominant narrative in the
debates regarding insurance and systemic risk focuses on the
fact that remarkably few insurers ultimately failed in connection with the global financial crisis.171 But as illustrated by life
insurers’ responses to unrealized losses on their guaranteedannuity products, even noncatastrophic losses to insurers can
have systemically important consequences for other sectors of
the financial system.172
b) Market distortions from insurers’ selling patterns. Insurers’ coordinated investment activities can also have potential
systemic consequences due to sudden decreases in insurers’ demand for certain securities or assets. For instance, insurers’ coordinated investment activities can potentially ignite or exacerbate
fire sales of assets, in which those assets sell well below their fundamental value.173 Such fire sales can play key roles in systemic
169

Yellen, Remarks at the International Conference at *2–3 (cited in note 168).
See Becker and Ivashina, Reaching for Yield at *29 (cited in note 167)
(“[R]eaching for yield is not innocuous in terms of the ultimate risks taken on by insurance companies.”).
171 See, for example, GAO Report at *17 (cited in note 7).
172 See text accompanying notes 160–64.
173 In a fire sale, the price of an asset is temporarily depressed below its fundamental
value. This is because the assets must be purchased by buyers with less familiarity with
and demand for those assets. See Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J Fin 1343, 1356–58 (1992)
(describing how assets could be sold to a buyer with a low fundamental valuation under
certain market conditions). Indeed, the financial industry and members of Congress have
170
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crises by limiting firms’ liquidity and creating uncertainty about
firms’ financial strength.174 Indeed, the inability of banks to offload or price toxic assets was the key reason for the failure or
near failure of numerous investment banks, including Lehman
Brothers.175 Alternatively, insurers’ coordinated investment activities can conceivably result in sudden shortfalls in expected funding sources, producing costly and potentially systemically significant substitution effects among players in financial markets.
Consider emerging evidence that a subset of insurers was involved in the fire sale of mortgage-backed securities in 2008. As
described above, insurers are substantial owners of mortgagebacked securities, and they had aggressively increased their
holdings of these instruments in the years leading up to the crisis. In 2008, a subset of insurers that became capital constrained
faced substantial pressures to offload these securities because
they were subject to accounting rules requiring that they mark
these assets to market value.176 In response, these carriers sold
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) at substantially
lower prices during this time period than did insurers not facing
regulatory constraints.177 Moreover, the RMBSs that experienced
the largest decline in credit quality during this period also sold
for the largest discount from their fundamental value.178

blamed fire sales of mortgage-backed securities for contributing to the severity of the financial crisis. See Iman Anabtawi and Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 Notre Dame L Rev 1349, 1372–73 (2011) (“[F]irms
subject to margin calls may be forced to engage in asset ‘fire’ sales, thereby depressing
prices, requiring more forced sales, and depressing prices even further, thus creating a
positive feedback effect.”).
174 See Anabtawi and Schwarcz, 86 Notre Dame L Rev at 1372–73 (cited in note 173).
175 See National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in
the United States, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report at *324–25 (cited in note 166).
176 See Merrill, et al, Fire Sales in Distressed Mortgage-Backed Securities at *18
(cited in note 22).
177 See id at *22–23.
178 See id at *21–22 (finding that insurers subject to rules requiring mark-to-market
accounting for RMBSs—property and casualty insurers, but not life insurers, until 2009—
were more likely to sell RMBSs during the financial crisis). Mark-to-market accounting
rules remove the disincentive that firms would otherwise face from selling assets at a time
when the firm believes that the market price does not reflect true asset value. See generally Andrew Ellul, et al, Mark-to-Market Accounting, Market Stress and Incentive Distortions, Rev Fin Reg Stud 6 (Summer 2013). The importance of mark-to-market accounting in contributing to fire sales by insurers is also supported by a second paper, by
the same authors who studied fire sales in the corporate bond market and the importance of capital constraints. See Andrew Ellul, et al, Is Historical Cost Accounting a
Panacea? Market Stress, Incentives Distortions, and Gains Trading *30–31 (NYU Working
Paper, 2012). But see Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
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Although the evidence suggests that only a subset of insurers played a role in this fire sale, most insurers would likely
have played a much larger role if it were not for two historically
contingent facts. First, throughout much of the crisis, many insurers were fortuitously not required to use mark-to-market accounting for their portfolio of RMBSs, diminishing their incentive to sell these instruments.179 Second, in the midst of the
crisis, the NAIC suddenly adopted a change in its RBC rules
that substantially reduced the capital charges associated with
RMBSs.180 Had either of these facts been different, insurers likely would have substantially exacerbated the fire sales in RMBSs
and prolonged the severity of the crisis.
Insurers’ capacity to trigger fire sales in capital markets is
likely much stronger in corporate bond markets, in which insurers are the dominant investors among all financial institutions.
Thus, one recent study offers compelling evidence that the
downgrading of corporate bonds can prompt large numbers of
insurers to sell the downgraded (or about-to-be downgraded)
bonds in a coordinated fashion in order to avoid adverse regulatory or rating-agency consequences.181 Analyzing insurer behavior between 2001 and 2005, the study found that insurers facing
comparatively large regulatory constraints were more likely
than other insurers to immediately sell bonds that were downgraded from investment-grade status.182 This process of forced
selling by regulatory-constrained firms caused the price of
downgraded bonds to temporarily fall below their fundamental
value.183 In particular, the study found that bonds’ prices were
more likely to depart from their fundamental value if the bonds
were disproportionately held by regulatory-constrained firms.184
Some commentators have downplayed the prospect that
insurers could trigger fire sales that could produce systemic
Wash U L Rev 211, 232–33 (2008) (discussing how regulation-motivated coordinated investor selling of securities can cause market collapses).
179 See Merrill, et al, Fire Sales in Distressed Mortgage-Backed Securities at *10
(cited in note 22).
180 See Hunt, 68 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1676–80 (cited in note 96).
181 See Andrew Ellul, Chotibhak Jotikasthira, and Christian T. Lundblad, Regulatory Pressure and Fire Sales in the Corporate Bond Market, 101 J Fin Econ 596, 596–98
(2011) (“[F]orced selling is most likely to occur in the downgraded bonds that are held by
regulatory-constrained insurers such as those that have low risk-based capital ratios.”).
182 See id at 605.
183 See id at 608. See also Anabtawi and Schwarcz, 86 Notre Dame L Rev at 1353–
56 (cited in note 173) (explaining how an economic shock can become systemic).
184 See Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 101 J Fin at 618 (cited in note 181).
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consequences on the basis that there are low cross-holdings between insurers’ and US banks’ investment portfolios.185 But
there are several problems with this view. First, as the crisis illustrated, insurers’ coordinated actions with respect to even a
relatively small component of their overall portfolio can disrupt
markets. Second, even a fire sale of investment securities that
were not directly held by banks could indirectly impact the value
of banks’ securities, such as by depressing larger segments of
the securities markets.186 Third, one substantial source of this
lack of overlap is attributable to privately placed bonds.187 Because no established secondary market for these types of securities exists, life insurers facing substantial liquidity needs would
need to look to other asset categories. Fourth—and most importantly—the lack of substantial overlap between the portfolios
of insurers and banks in the past does not mean there will not
be substantial overlap in the future. Indeed, European insurers
and banks currently have high cross-holdings of securities in
sovereign bonds.188 That suggests not only that the systemic risk
of insurer fire sales may be greater in Europe but also that the
(arguably) currently low US cross-holdings could fluctuate and
become greater.
Apart from the risk of fire sales, insurers’ dominant role in
financing US corporations raises the important potential risk
that a massive disruption in insurance markets could substantially impact corporate financing. Insurers are the major investors in corporate debt; their holdings in these instruments
equaled $1.5 trillion in 2011.189 Given that corporations fund
themselves much more through debt than equity, insurers are a
crucial source of funding for US corporations.190 If insurers were
forced to liquidate a substantial percentage of these holdings and
were unable to maintain their long-sustained investment appetite
for corporate debt, the results could be catastrophic. US corporations would have to either dramatically scale back their investments or find entirely new ways of funding their operations. This,
185 See, for example, Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk and Insurance at *31–32
(cited in note 19).
186 See id (“[B]anks and insurers are interconnected at least with respect to their
susceptibility to common economic and financial shocks.”).
187 See id at *19 (reporting that “[t]otal holdings of private placements represents
25.4% of life insurer bond portfolios”).
188 See id at *26.
189 McMenamin, What Do U.S. Life Insurers Invest In? at *2 (cited in note 160).
190 See id.
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in turn, could trigger new and unpredictable consequences in
volatile financial markets.
As above, insurers’ capacity to distort financial markets by
selling securities need not involve the ultimate failure of numerous carriers. Indeed, a key feature of fire sales is that those who
trigger these sales may end up safe because they sell their assets at only a small discount.191 But just like the first people in
line during a bank run, while the early participants in a fire sale
may emerge relatively unscathed from a crisis, that does not
mean that they were not instrumental in causing the crisis in
the first place.
Although insurers need not fail en masse in order for their
role as investors to stoke systemic risk, the converse is not true:
substantial failures of a series of insurers could well disrupt the
financial system by causing insurers to liquidate their portfolios
or suspend their future investments. In many cases, an insurance company’s failure can result in an immediate need for the
company or its receiver to liquidate much of its portfolio.192 For
instance, an insurance company could be required to quickly liquidate its portfolio if it failed due to a catastrophic event triggering an unmanageable number of claims, due to a failure of a reinsurer, or due to a run on products that permitted policyholders
to withdraw funds or take out loans against their policies.193 If
many insurers simultaneously experience this type of distress—
which is plausible given correlations in carriers’ catastrophe exposures, product features, and reinsurance portfolios194—it could
trigger, or exacerbate, the types of distortions in capital markets
that were witnessed in 2008.
Ultimately, there is strong, newly emerging evidence that numerous large life insurers played a major and under-appreciated
role in the crisis of 2008 by virtue of their role as investors in

191 This effect is potentially explained by the greater incentive of closely regulated
insurance companies to monitor assets for likely downgrades and sell assets at early
signs of trouble, in effect causing the fire sale conditions that drop asset prices for other
entities. See Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 101 J Fin Econ at 605 (cited in note 181).
192 But see Insurance Oversight and Legislative Proposals: Testimony before House Financial Services Subcommittee on Insurance Housing and Community Opportunity *9 (2011)
(statement of the National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations), online at https://www.nolhga.com/pressroom/articles/HFSCnolhgaTestimonyNov15
_2011.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (arguing that insurers need less liquidity than banks).
193 See Part II.B.
194 See Part II.B.
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mortgage-backed securities.195 Of course, this evidence—like
much about the financial crisis—is still uncertain and requires
further research and assessment. But the point here is not just
that insurers did, in fact, contribute to systemic risk in the most
recent financial crisis through their role in stoking demand and
contributing to fire sales in mortgage-backed securities. Rather,
the larger point is that insurers, as massive investors that often
act in a coordinated fashion with respect to their investment appetites and decisions, play an important role in the global financial system and in the potential accumulation of risk in that system.
2. Other potential linkages between insurers and the
financial system.
Insurers’ existing—and potential—connections to financial
markets are hardly exhausted by their roles as investors. Various additional linkages exist. In some cases, the magnitude of
these interconnections is not currently sufficient to raise systemic risks. In other cases, it is hard to know how to even measure
the systemic implications of these connections. But both of these
statements could almost certainly have been made about insurers’ (and their affiliates’) participation in CDSs ten years ago.
a) Insurance companies within complex financial-services
groups. Insurance companies are increasingly part of conglomerate financial-services groups that provide an array of financial
services, including banking and broker-dealer services.196 This
creates the prospect that insurance company failures or distress
could have serious consequences for noninsurance financial
firms within the conglomerate group. Risks are much more likely to spread among corporate affiliates than among independent

195 See Merrill, et al, Fire Sales in Distressed Mortgage-Backed Securities at *29
(cited in note 22).
196 See Aerdt Houben and Mark Teunissen, The Systemicness of Insurance Companies: Cross-Border Aspects and Policy Implications, in Liedtke and Monkiewicz, eds, The
Future of Insurance Regulation and Supervision 246, 254–59 (cited in note 132) (noting
that “euro area insurers’ financial assets roughly doubled in the [last] decade,” and that
many hedge funds and private equity groups manage assets owned by insurers). In part,
the rationale for the rise in conglomeration is to exploit synergies between financial services and parents’ businesses and also to take advantage of economies of scale and scope.
Some firms also hope that business diversification will reduce their earnings fluctuations. See Gordon F. Boreham, The Rise of Non-bank Financial Conglomerates: A Major
Trend in the Unfolding Financial Services Sector of the Canadian Economy, 9 Serv Indust J 90, 95 (1989).
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firms operating at arm’s length.197 For instance, new empirical
research shows that life insurers that are in financial distress
tend to receive large capital contributions from other entities
within their group and that this effect is concentrated in groups
with a large number of affiliates.198 A related concern is that the
holding company or other affiliates might be motivated to take
risky actions, effectively supported by (and thus taking advantage
of) government-backed guarantees of insurers. Although this concern is commonly cited in banking regulation,199 it is also a concern in the insurance industry, in which explicit state-guarantee
funds—and potentially implicit federal guarantees in the event
that state-guarantee funds fail—would seem to create a similar
type of moral hazard among affiliates.200
b) Insurance-linked securities. Insurers increasingly rely
on financial markets to take on catastrophe risk. The most prominent example of this is catastrophe bonds, which are issued by
insurers.201 Catastrophe bonds, like ordinary bonds, pay principal
197 See Richard J. Herring and Anthony M. Santomero, The Corporate Structure of
Financial Conglomerates, 4 J Fin Serv Rsrch 471, 477–80 (1990).
198 See Niehaus, Managing Capital and Insolvency Risk at *21–27 (cited in note 98).
199 See, for example, Herring and Santomero, 4 J Fin Serv Rsrch at 480 (cited in
note 197). US bank regulation attempts to address this concern most directly through
§ 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, which restricts transactions, such as lending, between
federally insured deposit-taking banks and their nonbank affiliates. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A
of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 NC L Rev 1683, 1692–93 (2011).
200 To be sure, insurance regulations attempt to ring-fence insurance companies by
requiring disclosure and approval of all material affiliated transactions. New state rules
also attempt to enhance the power of regulators to demand information about insurers’
affiliates and enhance group supervision by requiring that an Own Risk and Solvency
Assessment be completed at the holding-company level. See Federal Insurance Office,
How to Modernize and Improve the System of Insurance Regulation in the United States
*34 (Department of the Treasury 2013), online at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/How%20to%20Modernize%20and
%20Improve%20the%20System%20of%20Insurance%20Regulation%20in%20the
%20United%20States.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014). But it is an open question whether these
changes will be enough to reverse the clearly inadequate appreciation that state regulators had, prior to 2008, of risk to insurers posed by their affiliates. Moreover, all these
approaches to ring-fencing are directed to protecting insurers from risks arising from
their affiliates. None of the approaches is directed at the opposite threat: the prospect
that distress might spread to an insurance affiliate from an insurer. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S Cal L Rev 69 (2013).
201 See J. David Cummins, CAT Bonds and Other Risk-Linked Securities: State of
the Market and Recent Developments, 11 Risk Mgmt Ins Rev 23, 25–28 (2008). There also
appears to be growing investor interest in debt securities operating as reinsurance of
other insurable risks, including mortality and terrorism. See, for example, EdF’s Pylon
Marks First European Corporate Cat Bond, 834 Euroweek 47 (Dec 19, 2003) (describing
the structure of an issued catastrophe bond insuring against losses from windstorm
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and interest upon maturity; however, if certain contractually
specified catastrophic events—usually nonfinancial events, such
as a hurricane—occur before the bond matures, the principal is
forgiven. This makes catastrophe bonds unusually risky for investors, who can lose their entire investment if a catastrophe occurs.202 Investors are nonetheless willing to invest in catastrophe
bonds, in part because they assume that these bonds provide investment diversification, displaying little or no correlation to the
returns of shares and conventional bonds.203 Thus, the probability of a hurricane hitting a major urban area is not impacted by
the prospect of instability in financial markets.
Currently, investment in catastrophe bonds—amounting to
about $7 billion per year—is not significant enough to be systemically risky.204 But analysts expect that the size of this market could increase substantially in coming years, and in recent
years there already has been exponential growth in these types
of financial instruments.205 Moreover, catastrophe bonds could
well create important linkages between insurance and other financial markets because financial market risk and insuranceunderwriting risks are not always uncorrelated, as most assume.
Various types of events could conceivably trigger instability
simultaneously in financial markets and insurance markets.
Consider, for instance, a global pandemic. Such an event would
trigger payment on unprecedented numbers of life insurance
policies. But it could also trigger financial panic by, for instance,
triggering mass withdrawals of deposits or a collapse in stock
damage in France); Capital Markets Shield AXA from Extreme Mortality Risk, 978 Euroweek 62 (Nov 3, 2006) (summarizing the structure of a recent mortality bond that provides insurance against certain disasters such as a nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorist attack or a natural catastrophe in the United States, France, or Japan).
202 See Schwarcz, 94 Minn L Rev at 1785–86 (cited in note 19).
203 See id at 1786–87; Christopher M. Lewis and Peter O. Davis, Capital Market Instruments for Financing Catastrophe Risk: New Directions?, 17 J Ins Reg 110, 114
(1998); Angelika Schöchlin, Where’s the Cat Going? Some Observations on Catastrophe
Bonds, 14 J Applied Corp Fin 100, 102–03 (2002).
204 See Samantha Mortimer, Cat Bond Sales Finish 2012 near Record High, Property Casualty 360 (Jan 2, 2013), online at http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/
01/02/cat-bond-sales-finish-2012-near-record-high (visited Nov 3, 2014).
205 See Rodd Zolkos, Catastrophe Bond Market Poised for Record Issuance in 2013:
Report, Business Insurance (May 9, 2013), online at https://www.businessinsurance.com/
article/20130508/NEWS06/130509836 (visited Nov 3, 2014). See also Artemis, Catastrophe Bond Risk Premiums Slid Further by End of 2013, Artemis Blog (Feb 28, 2014),
online at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2014/02/28/catastrophe-bond-risk-premiums-slid
-further-by-end-of-2013 (visited Nov 3, 2014) (explaining that 2013 saw record sales of
catastrophe bonds and that premiums fell not because of a lack of demand or investor
risk aversion but because of increased competition by insurers).
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markets due to sharp reductions in consumer consumption. And,
of course, even otherwise-uncorrelated financial and underwriting risks might, over a large period of time, simultaneously occur simply as a matter of chance.
Another type of insurance-linked security that could potentially create important interconnections between insurance
markets and other financial markets are life insurance–backed
and annuity-backed securities. Financial firms have recently
been purchasing rights under life insurance policies and annuities from policyholders.206 In some (and perhaps many) cases,
policyholders have actually purchased life insurance or annuities after being contacted by a firm that has offered to fund this
insurance purchase.207 However these rights are acquired, financial firms repackage the rights into securities that are then sold
to investors.208 Just as with mortgage-backed securities in the financial crisis, there are various conceivable channels through
which securities backed by these insurance rights could trigger
systemic risk. For instance, widespread devaluation of these securities through insurer insolvencies or unanticipated and substantial changes in mortality rates could expose investors in
these securities—as well as the financial firms that acquire, repackage, and sell the securities—to serious losses.209
206 See Jenny Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street: Packing
Life Insurance Policies, despite Fallout from Mortgage Crisis, NY Times A1 (Sept 6,
2009):

The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” life insurance policies that ill and
elderly people sell for cash—$400,000 for a $1 million policy, say, depending on
the life expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these
policies, in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds or thousands together
into bonds. They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension
funds, who will receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. . . .
[S]ome in the industry predict the market could reach $500 billion. . . . Goldman Sachs has developed a tradable index of life settlements, enabling investors to bet on whether people will live longer than expected or die sooner than
planned.
207 See James J. Avery Jr, Securities Backed by Life Settlements: Considerations for
Institutional
Investors
*2
(Prudential
Financial
Jan
2011),
online
at
https://www.prudential.com/media/managed/Life_Settlements_Investing.pdf (visited Nov
3, 2014).
208 See Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street at A24 (cited in
note 206). As above, one of the draws of this type of financial product for investors is the
perception that the risk of nonpayment is not substantially correlated with other forms
of market-wide risk. See id (quoting Joshua Coval, professor of finance at Harvard Business School, who notes that “[t]hese assets do not have risks that are difficult to estimate
and they are not, for the most part, exposed to broader economic risks”).
209 See Avery, Securities Backed by Life Settlements at *2 (cited in note 207).
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c) Insurance as a prerequisite to credit. Insurance plays a
crucial role in secured lending of all types. When lenders take a
security interest or mortgage in collateral, they generally require the borrower to maintain insurance on the property
throughout the duration of the loan.210 On a superficial level, the
reason that lenders require such insurance is obvious: they want
their collateral protected so that, in the event of default, they
can look to that collateral for repayment. An important component of this explanation is that insurers are comparatively well
situated relative to investors to measure and manage the risks
associated with the prospect of damage to property.211 Indeed,
this is the core business of property insurers.
If disruptions in property-insurance markets suddenly make
unavailable property insurance of various types—such as homeowners, commercial property, auto collision and comprehensive,
or commercial auto—the result could be substantial disruptions
in the credit markets that rely on these forms of property to extend credit.212 Financial institutions that specialize in evaluating
credit risk would not be equipped to merely lend without insurance on the collateral, as it would be nearly impossible for them
to appropriately price this risk and manage the prospect of moral hazard. Using the vernacular of general frameworks on systemic risk, property insurance enjoys limited substitutability.213
d) Banks as guarantors of insurers. Another linkage between insurers and the larger financial system is that banks are
becoming guarantors of insurers. As discussed below, life insurers increasingly have been using captive insurance-company
subsidiaries to minimize the cost of complying with certain regulatory rules.214 To the extent that a captive reinsures a parent

210 See Kevin McKechnie, NAIC Hearing on Private Lender-Placed Insurance: Testimony
Submitted on Behalf of the American Bankers Association *2 (2012), online at http://
www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_120809_public_hearing_lender_placed_insurance
_testimony_mckechnie.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
211 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Management and Insurance:
Narrative and Procedures 3 (1990) (cautioning that companies that benefit from collateral insurance should assess the insurer’s financial strength to protect themselves from
insurer insolvency).
212 Professors J. David Cummins and Mary Weiss argue that small insurers would
fill the gap and note that large corporations have many insurance substitutes. See
Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk at *33 (cited note 19). But this depends on the size of
the disruption in the underlying insurance markets.
213 See Part I.A.
214 See notes 299–302 and accompanying text (referring to this phenomenon as
“shadow insurance”).
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life insurer’s risk, the captive—which usually has a lower regulatory cost than its parent—is required (in lieu of the parent) to
maintain capital reserves against that risk.215 The linkage with
the larger financial system is that many states require that the
captive’s reinsurance obligation itself be financially supported.216
That support typically takes the form of a bank-issued letter of
credit (LOC),217 which is a type of guarantee.218 Thus, if a captive
is unable to pay its reinsurance obligation, then the beneficiary
will draw down on the LOC, thereby requiring the bank to make
that payment.219 In this way, banks have effectively become
guarantors of life insurers’ ability to pay their claims.220
B.

Vulnerabilities of the Insurance System to Tail End Events

As noted above, insurers’ various existing and potential
linkages to the broader financial system have the potential to
generate systemic risk even in the absence of widespread instability within the insurance industry itself. But, of course, many
of the linkages between insurers and the rest of the financial
system described above create the prospect of systemic risk only
to the extent that the insurance industry itself is subject to the
prospect of widespread instability. In many cases, moreover, the
prospect that the linkages described above could trigger systemic risk depends on the risk that the insurance industry might
face an acute crisis demanding the immediate liquidation of a
substantial portion of its assets or the sudden cessation of its
funding of other sectors.221 In this Section we suggest that the
215 See Ralph S.J. Koijen and Motohiro Yogo, Shadow Insurance *5 (NBER Working
Paper No 19568, 2013), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2320921 (visited Nov 3, 2014).
216 See Captive and Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) Use (E) Subgroup of the Financial Condition (E) Committee, Captives and Special Purpose Vehicles *12–13 (NAIC
White Paper, June 6, 2013), online at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_cspv
_sg_2012_fall_nm_materials.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (noting that all states have some,
albeit lesser, requirements for captives).
217 See id at *4.
218 LOCs are agreements to make specified payments upon the presentation of documents that satisfy the negotiated conditions to payment. See UCC § 5-102(a)(10) (ALI
1995).
219 See NAIC Captives and Special Purpose Vehicle Use Subgroup, Captives and
Special Purpose Vehicles at *14 (cited in note 216).
220 Although banks may have the right to seek reimbursement in the event of an
LOC draw, that right is likely to be of limited value. But see id (discussing that right).
221 To be sure, many insurer failures do occur gradually, and the gradual unwinding of
insurance companies is indeed the historical norm. See Insurance Oversight at *9 (cited in
note 192); Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk at *17 (cited in note 19) (emphasizing

2014]

Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance

1611

insurance industry is indeed subject to such tail end risk and
that, in many cases, these risks could create sudden and dramatic financial pressures on carriers.
1. Catastrophe risk.
Catastrophe risk arises when individual policyholder losses
are correlated, resulting in large numbers of policyholder claims
being made within a short period of time.222 Catastrophe risk is
particularly relevant for systemic risk because it can result in a
large percentage of an insurer’s liabilities coming due immediately, producing very large liquidity needs. In many cases, insurers actively strive to limit their exposure to catastrophe risk
precisely because they face substantial limitations in their ability to raise sufficient funds to pay unexpectedly large numbers of
policyholder claims within a short period of time.223 Some of the
most important mechanisms by which insurers attempt this include excluding catastrophe-risk exposure in their insurance policies, diversifying their exposure to catastrophes, and transferring some of their catastrophe risk to reinsurers.224
Despite these efforts to manage catastrophe risk, insurers’
exposures to catastrophe risk can conceivably be quite large.225
Some insurers, for instance, do surprisingly little to mitigate catastrophe risks that have not occurred in the recent past (consistent with the availability heuristic, a commonly understood
behavioral bias226). Consider, for example, the risk of a global
repeatedly that the resolution of insolvent insurers is gradual and does not typically require the immediate sale of a substantial portion of the entity’s assets).
222 See Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J Risk & Ins 205, 206 (1997).
223 See American Academy of Actuaries Catastrophe Management Work Group, Catastrophe Exposure and Insurance Industry Catastrophe Management Practices 7–15
(2001).
224 See id at 13.
225 See id at 21 (noting that catastrophe events pose a major risk of insolvency for insurers and other entities that aggregate catastrophe exposure in writing property insurance given that catastrophe events violate the conditions of probability and independence).
226 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychology 207, 229 (1973) (“In thinking of [rare]
events we often construct scenarios . . . . The plausibility of the scenarios that come to
mind, or the difficulty in producing them, then serve as a clue to the likelihood of the
event.”) (emphasis omitted); Albert Phung, Behavioral Finance *15–17 (Investopedia
2011), online at http://i.investopedia.com/inv/pdf/tutorials/behavioralfinance.pdf (visited
Nov 3, 2014) (explaining overreactions in stock prices to new information as attributable
to availability bias). Recent research suggests that insurers, as well as consumers, are
subject to various heuristics and biases. See Howard C. Kunruether, et al, Insurance and
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pandemic. In 1918, the Spanish Flu alone killed 20 to 40 million
people within a single year.227 Unlike property-insurance policies, life insurance policies do not contain coverage exclusions for
such a tail end event. Such an event could therefore result in
massive additional claims against life insurers, which would owe
immediate payment on their policies over and above their actuarially expected payments.228 Even if those claims don’t imperil
the insurers’ own solvency, they could force insurers to simultaneously sell corporate bonds and other assets to raise cash,
thereby triggering the type of fire sales or sudden contractions
in corporate financing previously discussed.229
In other cases, insurers fail to limit their exposure to catastrophes because they do not even consider the possibility of the
catastrophe occurring until it does.230 The best illustration of this
point involves terrorism insurance. Prior to 9/11, commercial
property-insurance policies did not contain any explicit exclusions for terrorism insurance and insurers did not even include
this risk in their calculations of premiums.231 After 9/11, insurers
insisted that the terrorism risk was so large and incalculable
that they could not provide coverage at all, at least without an
explicit federal backstop.232 Although the massive losses that insurers incurred in connection with 9/11 did not substantially destabilize the industry, insurers’ sudden and dramatic shift in their
willingness to provide this coverage suggests that destabilization
might well have occurred if events had transpired differently.
Moreover, although it is rarely framed as such, the resulting
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002233—which provided an
Behavioral Economics: Improving Decisions in the Most Misunderstood Industry 162
(Cambridge 2013).
227 Jeffery Taubenberger and David Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics, 12 Emerging Infectious Diseases J 15, 15 (2006).
228 See Andrea Stracke and Winfried Heinen, Influenza Pandemic: The Impact on
Insured Lives Life Insurance Portfolio (Society of Actuaries 2006), online at
http://www.soa.org/library/newsletters/the-actuary-magazine/2006/june/pub-influenza-the
-impact-on-an-insured-lives-life-insurance-portfolio.aspx (visited Nov 3, 2014).
229 See notes 173–78 and accompanying text.
230 See Robert W. Klein, Regulation of Catastrophe Insurance: An Initial Overview
*9 (Wharton Catastrophe Risk Project 1998), online at http://ibrarian.net/navon/
page.jsp?paperid=125681 (visited Nov 3, 2014) (explaining the lag of insurers in recognizing the potential impact and likelihood of major environmental catastrophes).
231 See Michelle Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance,
93 Georgetown L J 783, 786 (2005).
232 See id at 787–88.
233 Pub L No 107-297, 116 Stat 2322 (2002), codified as amended in various sections
of Title 15.
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immediate federal reinsurance backstop for terrorism risk—
essentially amounted to a federal bailout of the insurance industry: without any ex ante charge to carriers, the federal government now reinsures most commercial terrorism risk.234
It is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to predict what future catastrophes might occur that the industry has failed to adequately anticipate or guard against. One potential example,
though, involves the burgeoning market for cyber insurance,
which protects firms against various risks associated with data
breaches, network damage, and cyber extortion.235 Interestingly,
these policies generally do not contain any exclusions for cyberterrorism or mass and widespread cyber-instability.236 Given the
increasing and unpredictable threat of cyberterrorism, it is not
difficult to imagine that this type of risk exposure could produce
massive correlated losses for a large segment of the insurance
industry. Notably, such an event might well independently and
simultaneously trigger wider financial instability.
2. Reinsurance opacity and interconnectedness.
Both property-casualty and life insurers rely extensively
on reinsurance to mitigate their catastrophe risk.237 In 2011, for
instance, US insurers ceded slightly more than $130 billion in
premiums to unaffiliated reinsurers, and approximately $110

234

See Boardman, 93 Georgetown L J at 788–89 (cited in note 231).
See Deirdre Fernandes, More Firms Buying Insurance for Data Breaches: Companies Seek Added Protection, Boston Globe (Feb 17, 2014) online at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/02/17/more-companies-buying-insurance-against
-hackers-and-privacy-breaches/9qYrvlhskcoPEs5b4ch3PP/story.html (visited Nov 3, 2014).
236 See generally Howard B. Epstein and Theodore A. Keyes, Insuring against Cyber
Risks: Coverage, Exclusions, and Considerations, 249 NY L J 3 (May 22, 2013) (explaining that typical policy exceptions relate to intentionally tortious or illegal conduct in obtaining or handling cyber data).
237 See American Academy of Actuaries, Catastrophe Exposure at 15 (cited in note
223); Jaffee and Russell, 64 J Risk & Ins at 215 (cited in note 222). Reinsurance can be
structured in different ways. For instance, it can apply to a particular risk or to a contractually specified grouping of business (facultative or treaty), and it can shift risks to
reinsurers on a proportional or nonproportional basis. Most commonly, reinsurers provide nonproportional treaty coverage, whereby the reinsurer agrees to bear the risk that
losses will exceed a specified threshold on a grouping of business, up to a certain limit.
One particularly important form of this type of reinsurance is excess-of-loss catastrophe
coverage, whereby a reinsurer agrees to pay, up to a limit, for any claims against an insurer above the predetermined threshold if those claims are the result of a specified type
of catastrophe. These policies may cover multiple catastrophes that take place within the
policy period, reinstating the stated limit after each event. See Abraham, Insurance Law
and Regulation at 781 (cited in note 43).
235
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billion in premiums to affiliated reinsurers.238 These amounts, of
course, roughly approximate the expected recoverable catastrophe cost to reinsurers in a single given year: the potential recovery from reinsurers in the event of a massive catastrophic event
or series of such events is obviously much larger.
At the same time that reinsurance reduces catastrophe risk
for insurers, it also exposes insurers to new risks. The most obvious is counterparty risk arising from the possibility that reinsurers
will be unable to follow through on their obligations.239 As with
catastrophe risk, this could produce sudden and unanticipated
liquidity needs for a primary carrier. But reinsurer failure could
also undermine the availability of reinsurance coverage in the
future, thus limiting the ability of insurers to write primary coverage.240 Additionally, reinsurer failure could impact insurers that
hold reinsurer-issued securities in their investment portfolio.241
Reinsurer counterparty risk exposes the insurance industry
to substantial vulnerabilities that, in many ways, resemble the
counterparty risk that banks were exposed to in 2008 as a result
of their derivative activities. First, the concentration of the reinsurance industry creates deep and substantial interconnections,
such that the failure of one or two major reinsurers could simultaneously impact a substantial segment of the insurance industry
238 Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risks at *13 (cited in note 19); Sojung Carol Park
and Xiaoying Xie, Reinsurance and Systemic Risk: The Impact of Reinsurer Downgrading
on Property-Casualty Insurers *7–8, 11 (China International Conference on Insurance
and Risk Management Paper, 2012), online at http://www.ccirm.org/conference/
2012/uploadfiles/A/III-A/1-ParkXie_Reinsurance%20and%20Systemic%20Risk%20The
%20Impact%20of%20Reinsurer%20Downgrading%20on%20Property-Casualty
%20Insurers_for_Qinghua2.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (noting the increase in the market
share of the top ten reinsurers from 35 percent in 1991 to 79 percent in 2009). Unfortunately, it is very difficult to tell how much reinsurance business with affiliates presents
significant counterparty risk. In the case of life insurance, much of the reinsurance described above is shadow insurance, which we discuss elsewhere. See text accompanying
notes 297–303. In the case of property-casualty insurance, many reinsurance arrangements with affiliates are a result of mergers-and-acquisitions activity, which does not
operate economically in a manner similar to true reinsurance. See Park and Xie, Reinsurance and Systemic Risk at *11.
239 See Saunders and Cornett, Financial Institutions Management at 791–92 (cited
in note 149); Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk at *13 (cited in note 19).
240 Without reinsurance, insurers would face drastically reduced capacity to write
coverage because various tax, regulatory, and accounting factors limit their ability to
hold capital to pay large numbers of roughly contemporaneous claims. See Jaffee and
Russell, 64 J Risk & Ins at 209–13 (cited in note 222).
241 But see Group of Thirty, Reinsurance and International Markets *5 (2006), online
at http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Reinsurance%20and%20International%20Financial
%20Markets.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (arguing that current life insurance exposure to reinsurance equities is too small to be significant in the event of a failure).
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at once.242 The reinsurance industry is extremely concentrated in
a few massive firms, such as Swiss Re, Munich Re, and Berkshire Hathaway.243 In 2011, the most recent year for which data
is available, for instance, five reinsurance groups provided approximately 67 percent of the world’s reinsurance capacity.244
This concentration is particularly acute for life insurers, which
place more than half of their nonaffiliate, reinsured risk with a
single reinsurer and more than 90 percent of this risk with the
top four reinsurers.245 Concentration in the reinsurance industry, moreover, is only trending upward due to mergers and acquisitions as well as organic growth.246
In addition to generating substantial interconnections within the insurance industry, reinsurer counterparty risk is highly
opaque—as were the derivative markets that contributed to the
financial crisis.247 Because reinsurance is an international business—the largest companies are located in Europe and Bermuda—there is a lack of uniformity about the ways in which these
companies are regulated.248 This means not only that it is hard
to know how much regulation directly limits default risk
through tools such as reserve and capital requirements, but also
that it is hard to acquire consistent financial data on different
firms. As an important 2006 Group of Thirty (“G30”) report explained, “[t]he risk information published by reinsurers varies
significantly across firms in both frequency and scope” resulting
242 See Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk at *26 (cited in note 19) (“Reinsurance is
the primary source of interconnectedness within the insurance industry.”); Acharya, et
al, Financial Regulation at *10 (cited in note 141) (“The reinsurance market increases
the interconnectedness of the system exponentially and therefore might increase the systemic risk in the overall market” because of the “bilateral [relationship] in nature and
[the lack of] adequate risk controls due to the opacity of bilateral markets.”).
243 Although regulators have downplayed the risk posed by reinsurers, they admit
that “high degrees of market concentration in the reinsurance sector could everything
else being equal raise sector interconnectedness and limit the degree of substitutability . . . [and thus] potentially raise intra-industry concerns.” International Association of
Insurance Supervisors, Reinsurance and Financial Stability 16 (2012).
244 A.M. Best, Reinsurers Resilient against Waves of Catastrophes, Economic Uncertainty *2 (Best’s Special Report Apr 23, 2012), online at http://www.ambest.com/press/
042303globalreinsurancereport.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
245 Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk at *30 (cited in note 19).
246 See Park and Xie, Reinsurance and Systemic Risk at *7–8 (cited in note 238).
247 See id at *5 (“There is a serious lack of transparency associated with the risk of
reinsurance transactions due to the international nature of reinsurance companies and
lack of standardized prudential supervision.”).
248 See Marie-Louise Rossi and Nicholas Lowe, Regulating Reinsurance in the Global Market, 27 Geneva Papers Risk & Ins 122, 127–29 (2002) (arguing that the reinsurance industry would benefit from more cohesive standards).
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in a “widespread perception that publicly available information
about both the financial state and the risk profile of reinsurance
companies is in many cases inadequate.”249 As a result, private
rating agencies are often understood to function as the “de facto
regulator” of reinsurers.250
Complicating matters further is the fact that reinsurers are
subject to a number of deeply complex risks. Because they rely
extensively on catastrophe models to price coverage, reinsurers
face a substantial amount of model risk.251 Yet the accuracy of
catastrophe models is notoriously difficult to assess.252 As with
all models, they rely on historical data to predict future risk,
which (as reliance on historical housing data showed) is inherently risky.253 Additionally, reinsurers face their own form of
counterparty risk due to their practice of purchasing reinsurance from other reinsurers (a process known as retrocession).254
This can result in retrocession spirals, wherein the failure of one
reinsurer exposes other reinsurers to loss, potentially compromising their ability to pay as well.255
All of this makes it very difficult for anyone—including insurers, creditors of reinsurers, credit-rating agencies, regulators,
and even reinsurers themselves—to accurately gauge reinsurerdefault risk.256 To be sure, two stress tests have found that, despite the various factors above, the failure of a major reinsurer
would not substantially impact primary insurers. First, a stress
test by the G30 conducted in 2006 concluded that the failure of a
major reinsurer representing 20 percent of the global market
would expose primary property-casualty insurers to losses of only 2 to 2.5 percent of global nonlife premiums.257 This conclusion
249

Group of Thirty, Reinsurance at *6, 13 (cited in note 241).
International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Risk Transfer
and the Insurance Industry *102 (Apr 2014), online at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/GFSR/2004/01/pdf/chp3.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
251 See Schwarcz, 87 Wash U L Rev at 217 (cited in note 178).
252 See American Academy of Actuaries, Catastrophe Exposures at *18 (cited in
note 223).
253 See id (arguing that reliance on historical housing data caused borrowers to inaccurately understand the risk that they incurred).
254 See Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk at *26 (cited in note 19).
255 This possibility was vividly displayed in the 1990s when a chain of Lloyds syndicates
failed as a result of having passed risk back and forth among themselves. See id at *27.
256 See Mark Flower, et al, Reinsurance Counterparty Credit Risks: Practical Suggestions for Pricing, Reserving and Capital Modeling *8–10 (July 2007), online at
http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/documents/reinsurance-counterparty
-credit-risks-practical-suggestions-pricing (visited Nov 3, 2014).
257 Group of Thirty, Reinsurance at *5 (cited in note 241).
250

2014]

Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance

1617

was driven by the fact that only 11 percent of such premiums
are ceded to reinsurers worldwide.258 Meanwhile, the report
speculated that any shortage of reinsurance would likely be
short-lived given low market entry barriers and the capacity of
remaining reinsurers to make up lost capacity.259 Second, a more
recent, post–financial crisis analysis similarly concluded that
the failure of a major reinsurer would not have a massive impact
on primary insurers and would likely result in only a small
number of primary carriers (approximately thirty) experiencing
their own rating downgrades.260
These simulations, however, do not establish that reinsurance cannot contribute to or cause systemic risk. Both simulations model the impact on primary insurers of an exogenous
shock on reinsurers. But, of course, insurer and reinsurer results are deeply correlated: both insurers and reinsurers are impacted by underwriting cycles, financial market conditions, and
catastrophic losses. Thus, any instability to insurers arising
from reinsurance counterparty risk would almost certainly be
paired with other sources of stress to insurers. Additionally,
both simulations implicitly assume that the instability of one reinsurer would not be correlated with instability of other reinsurers.261 This too may not be a realistic assumption: even ignoring
that reinsurers rely on similar risk models and are exposed to
similar catastrophe risks and market conditions,262 the industry
is subject to the prospect of correlated instability among reinsurers due to the prospect of a retrocession spiral.
Much more importantly, these analyses assess the vulnerability of the reinsurance system at a specific point in time. Our
point here, and the relevant point for assessing systemic risk (at
least from the perspective of designing an overarching regulatory
architecture), is that the structure of the underlying system is
capable of becoming systemically vulnerable in the future. Even
if earlier stress tests are correct that the reinsurance industry
poses little risk to the larger insurance system, core features of
258

Id.
See id.
260 See Park and Xie, Reinsurance and Systemic Risk at *23 (cited in note 238).
261 See Group of Thirty, Reinsurance at *38 (cited in note 241) (assuming that the failure of even a large reinsurer with 20 percent market share would not be catastrophic because 20 percent is not a large enough share, which implies that the failure would not be
correlated); Park and Xie, Reinsurance and Systemic Risk at *26–27 (cited in note 238).
262 See Schwarcz, 87 Wash U L Rev at 227 (cited in note 178) (referencing model failure that led to a pricing panic in the CDO and asset-backed-security financial markets).
259
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the structure of that industry—including its concentration, lack
of consistent regulation, and second-order linkages—make it intrinsically susceptible to the possibility of such a collapse in the
future.
3. Insurers’ guarantees against financial risk.
A substantial percentage of life insurers’ premiums are currently attributable to products that are principally investment
oriented and that guarantee contractually specified investment
returns to policyholders.263 Examples include variable annuities,264 fixed-indexed annuities,265 and guaranteed-investment
contracts.266 Perhaps the most stark example of this—which illustrates how insurance products can morph into financialguarantee products—is the contingent deferred annuity (CDA),
wherein an insurer guarantees that an investment vehicle chosen
by the policyholder and maintained independently of the insurer
(such as a 401(k) or mutual fund) will yield contractually specified
payments for the remainder of the policyholder’s lifetime.267
Insurance products incorporating investment guarantees
create the prospect that prolonged and unanticipated changes in
financial markets could place a substantial strain on numerous
life insurance companies at the same time. For instance, as apparently occurred from 2003–2007, unanticipated low interest
rates can cause substantial losses on products that contain

263 See Insurance Information Institute, Annuities (2014), online at http://www.iii.org/
article/annuities (visited Nov 3, 2014) (“Measured by premiums written, annuities are the
largest life/health product line.”).
264 For recent data on variable annuity sales, see Insured Retirement Institute,
Fixed Annuity Sales Push Industry-Wide Sales to Highest Level in Two Years (Dec 5,
2013), online at http://www.irionline.org/research/research-detail-view/fixed-annuity-sales
-push-industry-wide-sales-to-highest-level-in-two-years (visited Nov 3, 2014) (stating that
total variable annuity assets topped $1.7 trillion in 2013 and that sales averaged over
$35 billion a quarter).
265 For similar data on fixed annuity sales, including average quarterly sales in
2013 that topped $17 billion, see id.
266 See id.
267 See NAIC Contingent Deferred Annuity Subgroup, Report of the CDA Subgroup
to the Life Insurance and Annuities Committee Members (Feb 22, 2012). See also Letter
from Birny Birnbaum, Executive Director, Center for Economic Justice, to Ted Nickel,
Chair, NAIC CDA Subgroup *2 (Oct 8, 2012), online at http://www.naic.org/documents/
committees_a_contingent_deferred_annuity_wg_2012_fall_nm_materials.pdf (visited Nov
3, 2014) (voicing the concern that adverse market conditions could result in significant
financial loss for CDAs because exhaustion of holders’ financial assets would trigger
massive simultaneous claims).
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embedded interest-rate guarantees.268 Similarly, a sudden and
prolonged decrease in equity, real estate, or bond markets could
simultaneously place substantial pressure on insurers with
large portfolios of CDAs, guaranteed-investment contracts, or
traditional annuities with lifetime guarantees.269 It is worth remembering in this context that, while recovery from the 2008
crisis has in many ways been slow, the crisis was characterized
by a robust and relatively quick rebound in the value of most financial instruments, particularly equity markets.270 But this
need not always be true: some financial market collapses are
characterized by a long and sustained drop in the value of financial instruments.271
The widespread failure of investment guarantees could conceivably produce broader consequences: reduced retirement savings could trigger unanticipated mortgage and credit card defaults, a sudden uptick in the need for social services, or labor
market distortions as newly retired individuals attempt to
reenter the job market.272
4. Policyholder runs and guarantee-fund structure.
The insurance system may also be vulnerable to policyholder runs, a risk that could well increase in the future depending
on developments in insurance-policy design. In many types of
insurance, insureds “have a right to demand payment [only] on
the occurrence of a contractually specified event. This minimizes
268 See Merrill, Fire Sales in Distressed Mortgage-Backed Securities at *18 (cited in
note 22). Of course, insurers are exposed to a variety of potential risks associated with
interest rates, given the long-term nature of all life insurance products. See generally
Kyal Berends, et al, The Sensitivity of Life Insurance Firms to Interest Rate Changes, 37
Econ Persp 43 (2013).
269 For instance, in 1991 six major life insurers, each with over $4 billion in assets,
failed as a result of their common exposures to commercial real estate and junk bonds.
See Scott Harrington, Policyholder Runs, Life Insurance Company Failures, and Insurance Solvency Regulation, 15 Cato Rev Bus & Govt 27, 27 (1992).
270 See GAO Report at *11–12 (cited in note 7).
271 For a discussion of how the stock market crash and uncertainty in the value of
financial products led to drastic declines in consumer spending and were exacerbated by
instability in the US banking system, see Christina D. Romer, The Nation in Depression,
7 J Econ Persp 19, 29–33 (1993).
272 Various reports have emphasized that the global financial crisis taught that the
financial distress of individuals can rather easily morph into financial distress for the
financial system. See, for example, National Commission on the Causes of the Financial
and Economic Crisis in the United States, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report at *213–21
(cited in note 166) (describing how the rising default rate of individual homeowners
snowballed into a global financial crisis).
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the risk of a ‘run’ on an insurer.”273 But this is not true of many
life insurance products. Life insurance and annuity products often allow policyholders to cash out their policies.274 For some
products, such as deferred annuities, policyholders often have
the right to withdraw their funds with no penalties, at least after an initial contractually specified period.275 For other products, such as whole and universal life insurance, policyholder
withdrawals from cash-value accumulation often involve the
payment of penalties to the insurer.276 Apart from cash withdrawals, policyholders often enjoy contractual rights to take out
loans against their life insurance policies, which may come along
with much smaller fees and do not require forfeiting insurance
coverage.
These features of many life insurance policies mean that
policyholders who become concerned about their carriers’ solvency may well demand withdrawals or policy loans, producing a
downward spiral analogous to those found in classical bank
runs, in which some bank depositors panic, converging on the
bank in a “grab race” to withdraw their monies first.277 Although
this risk is well understood, it has historically been downplayed
because of the fees associated with many forms of policyholder
withdrawal.278 But there is indeed historical precedent for a run
273

Schwarcz, 94 Minn L Rev at 1753 (cited in note 19).
See Weber, 8 Berkeley Bus L J at 47 (cited in note 141). For instance, in its decision designating Prudential as a SIFI, FSOC noted that:
274

Although Prudential does not substantially depend on short-term funding, and
its life insurance and annuity products are generally considered to be relatively
long-term liabilities, a substantial portion of the liabilities in the U.S. general account are available for discretionary withdrawal with little or no penalty and
therefore could, in practice, have characteristics of short term liabilities. Policyholders in Prudential’s separate account and international insurance business
are also able to surrender policies for significant cash values on short notice.
FSOC, Final Determination Regarding Prudential at *8 (cited in note 148).
275 See FSOC, Final Determination Regarding Prudential at *8 (cited in note 148).
276 See id at *2–3.
277 See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring,
and the Market for Bank Control, 88 Colum L Rev 1153, 1156 (1988) (linking bank runs
and depositor collective action problems).
278 See, for example, Scott E. Harrington, Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance, in Scott, ed, Capital Adequacy beyond Basel 87, 93 (cited in note 19) (noting that
there is a smaller risk of runs in insurance than in banks); Guillaume Plantin and JeanCharles Rochet, When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of
Prudential Regulation 47–49, 90–93 (Princeton 2007) (discussing how deductible fees associated with insurance-policy withdrawals minimize moral hazards and corresponding
risks that remain present in the withdrawal of demandable bank deposits, and finding
no evidence of a contagion effect in insurance).
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on a life insurance company: in 1991, policyholders withdrew
over $3 billion from Executive Life in the year prior to its failure.279 Although this run was more a product of Executive Life’s
tenuous financial position than the cause of its tenuous position,
it did indeed have the effect of forcing Executive Life to liquidate
a substantial percentage of its portfolio.280
Moreover, the risk of a run on a life insurer is likely increasing. First, life settlement companies have increasingly offered
policyholders the option of selling their policies to investors for
much larger sums than the surrender value (the opposite side of
the insurance-backed securities market described above).281 As
this industry becomes more and more sophisticated and prevalent, insurers will increasingly face market pressures to allow
policyholders to cash out of their policies at amounts approaching their net present value.282 This is because insurers decidedly
do not want policyholders selling their policies to investors—
unlike policyholders, investors never let policies lapse.283
Second, life insurers are increasingly making payouts to policyholders by issuing retained-asset accounts, which operate almost exactly like bank accounts: policyholders can withdraw
their funds from these accounts at any time, with no fee, simply
by using instruments that function almost identically to
checks.284 Unlike bank accounts, however, these accounts are not
backed by FDIC insurance. A recent survey by the Texas Department of Insurance of 160 life insurers found open retained-asset

279

See Harrington, 15 Cato Rev Bus & Gov at 29 (cited in note 269).
See id. The failure of Executive Life was a major contributor to the states reforming their RBC regimes. See Bill Coffin, et al, The Complete ELNY Saga: 21 Years of
Mismanagement, Corruption, Broken Promises and Shattered Lives (LifeHealthPro
2013), online at http://www.lifehealthpro.com/pages/the-complete-elny-saga.php (visited
Nov 3, 2014). But while the reform of the state RBC regime might well limit the risk of a
failure such as that of Executive Life, it does not alter the fundamental point that insurers can indeed be susceptible to policyholder runs when insurers’ policyholders lose confidence in their long-term solvency.
281 See Nadine Gatzert, The Secondary Market for Life Insurance in the United
Kingdom, Germany, and the United States: Comparison and Overview, 13 Risk Mgmt &
Ins Rev 279, 287–91 (2010).
282 See id at 296.
283 See Eryn Mathews, STOLI on the Rocks: Why States Should Eliminate the Abusive Practice of Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 Conn Ins L J 521, 530 (2007).
284 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Retained Asset Accounts and
Life Insurance: What Consumers Need to Know about Life Insurance Benefit Payment
Options (Aug 2010), online at http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_alert_raa.htm
(visited Nov 3, 2014).
280
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accounts totaling $2.3 billion for policyholders living in Texas
alone.285
One objection to the prospect that life insurers could be subject to a run by policyholders is that many life insurers contractually maintain the right to delay payouts on policies with immediate withdrawal benefits. But as FSOC emphasized in
rejecting this argument in the context of designating Prudential
as a SIFI, “the company could have strong disincentives to invoke” a contractual withdrawal right “because of the negative
signal invoking such a deferral could provide to counterparties,
investors, and policyholders.”286 This rationale, of course, applies
with equal force to other insurers.
While there is limited historical evidence of policyholder
runs at one insurer triggering defaults at other insurers, the existence of state-by-state, rather than federal, guarantees of policyholder payment increases the risk that a run on one institution could cause runs at other institutions. This is because stateguarantee funds are much less reliable and complete than FDIC
insurance.287 State-guarantee funds are not generally prefunded,
they limit payouts to amounts that are often well below the face
value of insurance policies, they are subject to a per-claimant
limit, and they are not (explicitly) backed by the federal government.288 Moreover, state-guarantee funds are premised on
the capacity of nontroubled insurers to cover the obligations of
failing insurers.289 As such, their capacity to handle several major
insolvencies concurrently is highly doubtful. Indeed, attempting
to force surviving carriers to shoulder the burden created by
several large insolvencies could actually endanger the health of
otherwise-solvent insurers, thereby generating a downward spiral in insurance markets.

285 Texas Department of Insurance, Retained Asset Accounts Survey *2 (2011), online
at http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/life/documents/raareport.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
286 FSOC, Final Determination Regarding Prudential at *10 (cited in note 148).
287 See Martin F. Grace and Hal S. Scott, An Optional Federal Charter for Insurance: Rationale and Design, in Grace and Klein, eds, The Future of Insurance Regulation
in the United States 55, 90–91 (cited in note 19).
288 See id at 89–91; Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Model Act
§ 3(C)(2) (NAIC July 2009), online at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-520.pdf (visited
Nov 3, 2014).
289 See Grace and Scott, An Optional Federal Charter for Insurance at 89 (cited in
note 287) (noting that the state-guarantee-fund system is “in place to compensate for the
losses suffered by third parties and policyholders due to insurance company insolvency”).
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5. Systematic errors in life insurers’ reserves.
Perhaps the most common reason that individual insurers
fail is that they set aside an insufficient amount of money to pay
for future claims.290 Such errors in setting policyholder reserves
are common in insurance, simply because it is often difficult to
predict the frequency and magnitude of future claims.291 This is
particularly true for insurance policies for which there is a substantial gap of time between the purchase of the policy (when an
insurer must set reserves) and the ultimate payout of a claim.
Insurers that are experiencing financial difficulty are particularly likely to underreserve in an attempt to mask the degree of
their troubles.292
Much more troublingly from a systemic-risk perspective,
underreserving and underpricing of risk have become repeated
and industry-wide phenomena in property-casualty insurance
markets.293 Indeed, property-casualty markets are generally
characterized by oscillation between “hard markets” (in which
coverage is relatively scarce and unavailable) and “soft markets”
(in which coverage is relatively cheap and available). Even apart
from these cyclical patterns in reserving, liability insurers have
frequently underestimated reserves due to their failure to anticipate increases in liability exposure resulting from medical
malpractice, asbestos, and pollution-remediation expenses.294
Similarly, long-term-care insurers substantially underestimated
their loss reserves in the 1990s by failing to fully account for
large increases in long-term-care expenses as well as the effects
290 See Plantin and Rochet, When Insurers Go Bust at 27 (cited in note 278); Cummins and Weiss, Systemic Risk at *36 (cited in note 19) (attributing 29 percent of life insurer insolvencies and 42 percent of property-casualty-insurer insolvencies to inadequate
pricing and deficient loss reserves).
291 See Martin F. Grace and J. Tyler Leverty, Property-Liability Insurer Reserve Error: Motive, Manipulation, or Mistake, 79 J Risk & Ins 351, 353 (2012).
292 See id at 353, 361–63.
293 See generally US Department of Treasury Financial Research Advisory Committee Research Subcommittee, OFR Study on the Insurance Sector Recommendation (Feb
24, 2014), online at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/about/Documents/FRAC
%20Research%20OFR%20Study%20on%20the%20Insurance%20Sector%20Recommendation
.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
294 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Liability Century: Insurance and Tort Law from
the Progressive Era to 9/11 126, 156–62 (2008) (explaining how legal and social changes
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century led to new and unexpected forms of
insurer exposure in these sectors); L. Lee Colquitt, The Impact of Asbestos and Environmental Reserves Increases on Shareholder Wealth, 10 N Am Actuarial J 17, 17 (2006)
(“[M]ost analysts agree that U.S. insurers are underreserved for asbestos and environmental liability.”).
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of an aging population.295 These types of systematic errors in reserving have had significant consequences for the availability
and structure of future insurance coverage.296 But their common
reoccurrence is not surprising: competition among carriers for
business can lead to overly optimistic estimates of long-term liabilities, particularly when the managers of companies that ultimately control these figures have a strong incentive to focus on
short-term results.297
In the past, systematic errors in reserving have been limited
in the life insurance domain because life insurers have historically faced rigid and conservative reserving rules for life insurance and annuity products.298 The strictness of these rules is due
in part to the extremely long time horizons between the purchase of coverage and the payout of a claim for these products,
which creates potentially outsized risks of reserve errors. However, two recent, and related, developments suggest that this
longstanding history of conservative reserving in life insurance
may not extend into the future.
First, in the last decade or so, life insurers have increasingly
used captive insurance companies to escape regulatory rules
governing reserve setting, a process that some have referred to
as “shadow insurance.”299 Traditionally, captive insurers were
simply a way for a traditional noninsurance company, such as
Coca-Cola or General Motors, to self-insure its risks rather than
purchase conventional insurance.300 From this perspective, it
295 See SCOR Global Life, Focus 2012: Long Term Care Insurance *16–19 (SCOR
2012), online at http://www.scor.com/images/stories/pdf/library/focus/LIFE_Focus%20LTC
%20EN%2010-2012.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
296 See id at *19 (explaining the response of long-term-care insurers to raise prices and
lower coverage); Baker, Medical Malpractice at 60–62 (cited in note 63) (explaining the relationship between the liability insurance crisis and errors in insurers’ loss reserves).
297 See US International Trade Commission, Property and Casualty Insurance Services: Competitive Conditions in Foreign Markets 2–13 (2009) (describing the insurancemarket cycle between “soft” and “hard” years).
298 See Steven D. Lash and Rebecca Kao Wang, Demystifying Life Insurance Securitization: XXX and AXXX Securitization Issues and Considerations, 61 Fin Rep 18, 18–19
(2005).
299 Mary Williams Walsh and Louise Story, Seeking Business, States Loosen Insurance Rules, NY Times A1 (May 8, 2011). See also Koijen and Yogo, Shadow Insurance at
*4–5 (cited in note 215) (examining the changes in state law that allowed for shadow insurance to operate through captive companies). Shadow insurance may also have the
effect of increasing the interconnections between the insurance industry and the banking
industry. See Part II.A (discussing banks as guarantors of insurers).
300 See NAIC, Captives and Special Purpose Vehicles at *9 (cited in note 216) (emphasizing the risk to policyholders of this practice, because insurers use it to avoid statutory accounting rules). Although this draft has been approved by the Captives and Special Purpose
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makes little sense for an insurer to set up its own captive. But
life insurers realized that they could exploit the rules governing
captive insurers to avoid what they deemed to be excessive reserve requirements.301 To do this, a life insurer transfers some of
its risk to the captive insurer via a reinsurance transaction.302
This transaction can reduce reserves because insurers do not
need to reserve against risks that are transferred to reinsurers
(even if they are affiliated). Meanwhile, captive insurers are subject to a much looser set of solvency rules than ordinary insurers
and can generally choose their regulator among any of the
states.303 According to the New York Superintendent of Financial
Services, “[S]hadow insurance . . . puts the stability of the
broader financial system at greater risk.”304 Indeed, one recent
estimate concludes that “shadow insurance reduces risk-based
capital by 53 percentage points and ratings by 3 notches . . .
imply[ing] a 10-year impairment probability that is four times
that implied by the reported ratings.”305

Vehicle (SPV) Use (E) Subgroup of the Financial Condition (E) Committee of the NAIC, it
is still under review (and has not yet been approved) by that full committee.
301 See New York State Department of Financial Services, Shining a Light on Shadow Insurance: A Little-Known Loophole That Puts Insurance Policyholders and Taxpayers at Greater Risk *4–5 (June 2013), online at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/
shadow_insurance_report_2013.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
302 See Koijen and Yogo, Shadow Insurance at *5 (cited in note 215).
303 See NAIC, Captive and Special Purpose Vehicles at *14–15 (cited in note 216). A
survey of all fifty states conducted by the Captives and Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
Use (E) Subgroup of the Financial Condition (E) Committee of the NAIC revealed that
the differences in solvency standards for captives, as compared to a commercial insurer,
include no statutory deposit requirements, no lower minimum-capital and surplus requirements, no RBC requirements, and a lack of mandatory examination. See generally
National Association Insurance Commission, Captives & SPV Use (E) Subgroup: Call for
Comment—Survey Results, online at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e
_cspv_sg_related_docs_survey_results.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014). See also Robert Stein,
Time for an Overhaul of State-Based Regulation, Best’s Review 93 (July 2009) (“I have
watched with bewilderment the establishment of stringent reserve and capital requirements, only to see regulatory endorsement of the use of offshore and onshore captives to
avoid those standards. Some states’ recent actions go even further, by apparently eliminating collateral requirements for reinsured reserves.”).
304 Benjamin M. Lawsky, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference
on the State of the U.S. and World Economies in New York City (Apr 18, 2013), online at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches_testimony/sp130418.htm (visited Nov 3, 2014)
(emphasizing that shadow insurance “could leave insurance companies less able to deal
with losses” because such insurance “does not actually transfer the risk for those insurance policies off the parent company’s books, because in many instances, the parent
company is ultimately still on the hook for paying claims if the [captive’s] weaker reserves are exhausted”).
305 Koijen and Yogo, Shadow Insurance at *2 (cited in note 215).
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Second, state insurance regulation is currently embarking
on a fundamental change to the rules governing the setting of
life insurers’ reserves. Rather than requiring a relatively mechanical and conservative approach to this exercise, states are
organizing through the NAIC to implement a process of principlesbased reserving (PBR), which would grant insurers substantial
discretion to set their own reserves based on internal models of
their future exposures.306 The role of regulators in this regime
would be to oversee insurers’ processes for setting reserves and
ensure that insurers comply with broad high-level principles.
But as the FIO’s recent report warned, “State regulators require
significant additional technical expertise or resources to properly evaluate the rigor and quality of idiosyncratic reserve models
that vary among firms within a heterogeneous insurance industry.”307 Given the extensively documented inability of federal
regulators to fully understand and vet the internal models of financial firms prior to the crisis,308 it is unclear whether states
will be able to effectively constrain firms’ reserving decisions in
this new regime.
These developments raise the possibility that a large segment of life insurers could face substantial financial instability
due to systematic reserve errors across the industry. Changes in
both regulatory rules and regulatory-arbitrage technology have
caused or will cause fundamental shifts in the way that most life
insurers account for their central liabilities. Yet, as noted above,
life insurers potentially face strong incentives to underreserve
as a result of the long-term nature of their liabilities and the
short-term orientation of management309 and shareholders (at
least in the case of insurers organized as corporations).310 Although persistent underreserving would only gradually weaken insurers, public recognition that many insurers have systematically

306 See Weber, 8 Berkeley Bus L J at 105–15 (cited in note 141) (explaining the development and mechanism of PBR by NAIC).
307 FIO, How to Modernize and Improve at *36 (cited in note 200).
308 See John C. Coffee Jr and Hilary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 Va L Rev 707, 741–44 (2009) (describing the SEC’s inadequate resources in measuring investment banks’ compliance with Basel II capital requirements).
309 See Claire Hill and Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision beyond Shareholder Interests:
Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 Seattle U L Rev
1173, 1184 (2010) (discussing conflicts between the short-term interests of investment
bankers and long-term stability).
310 See Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus
Stock, 1 J L, Econ & Org 125, 131 (1985).
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underreserved for years and are consequently insolvent could
well be swift and dramatic.
III. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS: EMPOWERING THE FIO TO
REGULATE SYSTEMIC RISK IN INSURANCE RESULTING FROM
CORRELATIONS AMONG FIRMS
As described in Part I, the current US insurance regulatory
regime delegates virtually all responsibility for regulating the
business of insurance (outside of health insurance) to the states.
A small handful of insurance-focused financial companies—
currently numbering three—that are individually deemed “systemically important” receive an additional layer of regulatory
scrutiny at the federal level. So too do insurance-focused financial companies that own (or are) a depository institution. Part II,
however, argued that entire segments of the insurance industry
may pose systemic risks to the larger financial system due to
correlations in individual insurers’ investment activities, underwriting exposures, and risk-management techniques, among
others. The logical implication of these two parts is that the federal government currently delegates to the states virtually exclusive responsibility for regulating entire segments of a sector
of the financial system that can contribute to systemic risk.
This Part begins by arguing that this is a deep mistake in
regulatory architecture. Because systemic risk is, by definition,
nationally and internationally significant, it must be regulated—at least in part—at these levels of governance. Therefore,
this Part argues that a federal regulator should play a more robust role in overseeing the insurance industry in conjunction
with the states. Section B describes one potential option for accomplishing this: empowering the FIO to preempt state law and
potentially even conduct its own regulatory activities. To ensure
that the FIO exercises this authority judiciously, this Article
suggests that any proposals by the FIO to intervene in state insurance regulation to reduce systemic risk would need to be preapproved by FSOC.
A.

State Insurance Regulation and Systemic Risk

State insurance regulation is poorly equipped to address systemic risk in insurance for at least two fundamental reasons. The
first and more important involves a central tenet of federalism,
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which has been labeled the “internalization principle”:311 regulatory responsibilities should generally be assigned—at least in
part312—to the unit of government that best internalizes the full
costs of the underlying regulated activity.313 Thus, the federal
government should play an important part in the regulation of
pollution that crosses state boundaries, such as air and water
pollution. By contrast, individual states should generally regulate potential pollution whose harmful effects would be entirely
confined within their boundaries. The rationale for this principle
is that government entities will have optimal incentives to take
into account the full costs and benefits of their regulatory decisions only if the impacts of those decisions are felt entirely within their jurisdictions.314 Delegating to states sole regulatory responsibilities over activities that produce negative externalities
nationally or internationally will generally lead to underregulation of those activities.315
Because systemic risk in insurance is a negative externality
whose effects are felt nationally and internationally, the internalization principle suggests that insurance should be regulated—at least in part—by national and international regulatory
bodies. At root, systemic risk in insurance—like all systemic
risk—is simply one particular type of negative externality that
can arise from the activities of individual insurers: insurers enjoy
all the profits attributable to providing coverage in the absence of
a financial crisis, but many of the costs of a financial crisis are
borne by society at large in the form of diminished macroeconomic

311 Robert D. Cooter and Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan L Rev 115, 137 (2010). See also Clayton P. Gillette,
Who Should Authorize a Commuter Tax?, 77 U Chi L Rev 223, 233 (2010).
312 Although this caveat is not always included within the internalization principle,
it can be explained by the significant literature on cooperative federalism and the like,
which shows that, in some cases, cooperation among different levels of government can
produce benefits such as decreasing regulatory capture or better accommodating local
tastes and preferences. See Amanda Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 Minn L Rev 1343, 1356
(2013).
313 For the origins of this principle, see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 14–16
(Harcourt 1972).
314 See id at 46–47.
315 As Professors Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel note, in a world with zero transaction costs, states could theoretically coordinate with one another to address this type of
problem. See Cooter and Siegel, 63 Stan L Rev at 139 (cited in note 311). But because
transaction costs with respect to devising such regulation are generally quite high, this
type of coordination is practically a limited solution. See id at 139–44.
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activity.316 Therefore, state insurance regulators will predictably
have insufficient incentives to appropriately regulate activities
in insurance markets that can generate systemic risk. Whereas
the costs of such regulation are predominantly felt locally—in
the form of increased premiums for consumers, decreased profits
for insurers,317 and decreased premium tax revenues for state
governments318—the benefits are enjoyed by a diffuse set of national and international actors to whom local lawmakers are not
accountable.
The mismatch between the national and international consequences of systemic risk in insurance and the state regulation
of insurance is potentially even worse than this straightforward
application of the internalization principle might suggest. As described in Part II.B, one of the important potential drivers of
systemic risk in insurance is solvency-based regulation, which is
designed to ensure that insurers can pay policyholders when
their claims come due. Indeed, it was precisely this type of regulation that caused some insurers to increase their holdings of
mortgage-backed securities and then to sell them en masse at
the first sign of trouble.319 As a result, state-based regulation to
protect consumers from less than full payment stemming from
insolvencies may ironically exacerbate systemic risk.320 Here, as
suggested by the internalization principle, state regulators will
tend to favor regulation that protects consumers within their
state even if such regulation has the side effect of exacerbating
systemic risk. But this type of conflict is particularly insidious
because it may be hard to identify given the counterintuitive
way in which state regulation favors the interests of local constituents over national interests.
316 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 61 SMU L Rev 209, 212–13 (2008).
317 Most regulation, of course, comes along with costs that are borne by consumers
and firms. See Office of Management and Budget, 2013 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities *10–15 (2013), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
inforeg/2013_cb/2013_cost_benefit_report-updated.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (estimating
the costs of regulation).
318 States generate substantial revenue from premium taxes. See Spencer L. Kimball
and Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarranFerguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 Mich L Rev 545, 554 (1958).
319 See text accompanying notes 155–91.
320 The notion that financial regulation may exacerbate systemic risk has been explored elsewhere. See Whitehead, 96 Cornell L Rev at 346–58 (cited in note 16); Roberta
Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 Yale J Reg 1, 68–76 (2014).
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All of this suggests that national and international regulatory bodies should be significantly involved in regulating activities that generate systemic risk in insurance. Indeed, in recent
decades, the need for such national and international regulation
of financial activities that can produce systemic risk has been
widely acknowledged.321 Thus, the last century has seen a gradual nationalization of regulation in both the banking and securities domains, particularly with respect to issues involving prudential regulation and systemic risk rather than consumer
protection.322 Similarly, it has seen the increasing importance of
international norm-setting bodies such as the Basel Committee
and the International Organization of Securities Commissions.323
Enhancing federal regulation of systemic risk in insurance
should promote greater international coordination of systemic
risk and insurance. Currently, the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) generates soft law on insurance
regulation generally, and on the regulation of systemic risk in
insurance in particular.324 These white papers, principles, and
frameworks do not directly bind countries but nonetheless play
an important role in the development of insurance regulation
globally.325 Not surprisingly, however, the state-based framework for insurance regulation in the United States has made

321 See, for example, Christopher J. Brummer, How International Financial Law
Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 Georgetown L J 257, 269–70 (2011).
322 See id at 273. See also Benn Steil, Regulatory Foundations for Global Capital
Markets, in Richard O’Brien, ed, 6 Finance and the International Economy 63, 66 (Oxford
1992) (“Since any systemic effects of inadequate or misguided regulation in one jurisdiction cannot be contained within that single jurisdiction, the imposition of universal
standards or modes of operation is likely to be the only effective response.”). The more
prominent role of states in regulating consumer protection in banking and securities
regulation is roughly consistent with the internalization principle, as many consumerprotection issues are felt predominantly within states. Moreover, allowing states to retain some authority over consumer-protection issues, concurrently with the federal government, can serve other goals such as reducing regulatory capture. See Amy Widman
and Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 Cardozo L Rev 53, 64–65 (2011).
323 See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 Va
J Intl L 685, 688–700 (2012).
324 See generally International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Insurance Core
Principles, Standards, Guidance and Assessment Methodology (Oct 12, 2013); International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Common Framework for the Supervision of
Internationally Active Insurance Groups (Oct 17, 2013). For more on soft law, see generally Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st
Century (Cambridge 2012) (examining the international system of nonbinding soft law
that governs financial institutions).
325 See Brummer, 99 Georgetown L J at 284–90 (cited in note 321).
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American participation in this process immensely complicated.326
Although Dodd-Frank partially addressed this issue by empowering the FIO to represent American interests internationally,327
this approach faces the obvious and important limitation that
the FIO itself has no actual regulatory authority over the insurance industry.328 As such, the FIO’s subscription to international
norms in the IAIS has limited influence on individual states,
which have often resisted developments at the IAIS relevant to
the regulation of systemic risk in insurance.329
Aside from the internalization principle, a second fundamental reason that state regulation is poorly equipped to address systemic risk in insurance is that state regulators lack the
necessary expertise and perspective. As described above, systemic risk in insurance arises in large part because of the pervasive and ever-changing nature of the interconnections between
the insurance industry and the rest of the financial system.330
But state regulators have very limited expertise or oversight
over any part of the financial system other than insurance. Virtually all securities regulation at the state level is focused on
fraudulent sales to consumers or on relatively small offerings.331
And while state banking regulation is more robust than state
securities regulation, it likewise focuses predominantly on consumer protection and on the regulation of smaller, community

326 See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance
Regulation, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L 953, 984–88 (2009) (explaining that, because state insurance regulators have a difficult time working together, they are poorly suited to represent national interests in international insurance regulation); Elizabeth F. Brown, Will
the Federal Insurance Office Improve Insurance Regulation?, 81 U Cin L Rev 551, 576
(2012) (noting that the fragmented nature of American insurance regulation has frustrated the negotiation of international agreements); Financial Stability Board, Peer Review
of
the
United
States
*10
(Aug
27,
2013),
online
at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130827.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014)
(“While the FIO represents the US on international insurance matters and negotiates
covered agreements, only the states have the authority (but are under no legal obligation) to implement laws that are consistent with those agreements and international
standards agreed within the IAIS.”).
327 See Part I.C.
328 See Brown, 81 U Cin L Rev at 584–85 (cited in note 326) (noting the FIO’s limitations in participating in international developments at the IAIS because the FIO is not
itself a regulator).
329 See Elizabeth Festa, NAIC Says International Capital Standards Won’t Replace
State RBC Regime, (LifeHealthPro Dec 15, 2013), online at http://www.lifehealthpro.com/
2013/12/15/naic-says-international-capital-standards-wont-rep (visited Nov 3, 2014).
330 See Part II.A.
331 See James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman, and Donald C. Langevoort, Securities
Regulation: Cases and Materials 15–16 (Aspen 6th ed 2009).
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banks.332 Moreover, state banking regulation operates in conjunction with, and subject to the oversight of, a large number of
federal banking regulators, including the FDIC, the Fed, and the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).333 Similarly, after Dodd-Frank, virtually all regulation of the shadow-banking
system occurs at the federal level.334 In sum, the vast majority of
regulatory expertise on (noninsurance) financial regulation is located at the federal, rather than the state, level.
To be sure, state insurance regulators can, in theory, attempt to coordinate with federal financial regulators to the extent necessary to regulate issues surrounding systemic risk. But
even apart from the internalization principle, these efforts are
often unproductive and fraught with posturing and politics.335 In
large part this is because state insurance regulators are often so
preoccupied with maintaining their tenuous grip on authority
that they reflexively resist federal involvement in insurance
matters, even when it comes from noninsurance federal regulators.336 Additionally, such coordination is substantially impeded
by the fifty-plus different insurance jurisdictions, each of which
may be represented by commissioners with very different views
about regulation generally and about the prospect of systemic
risk in insurance in particular.337
Not only do state insurance regulators have limited
knowledge and expertise about noninsurance financial markets,
but they often have limited perspective about potential systemwide risk within insurance markets themselves. State insurance
regulation in the United States is conducted almost exclusively
on a legal entity basis, meaning that insurance regulators focus
the bulk of their regulatory scrutiny on individual insurance

332 See Carnell, Macey, and Miller, The Law of Banking at 81–86, 336–37 (cited in
note 60) (discussing the interaction between state and federal banking law in the dual
banking system and state consumer-protection regulation).
333 See id at 62–64.
334 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural Address for the
Inaugural Symposium of the Review of Banking & Financial Law, 31 Rev Bank & Fin L
619, 631–36 (2012) (analyzing Dodd-Frank’s various provisions for regulating shadow
banking).
335 See Kenneth Meier, The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of Insurance
84–87 (SUNY 1988).
336 See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L Rev 394, 457–59 (2014).
337 See FIO, How to Modernize at *31 (cited in note 200) (describing the lack of uniformity in state insurance regulation across a number of different dimensions arising
from disagreements among states regarding regulatory priorities).
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companies.338 By contrast, insurance regulators do not focus extensive attention on insurance holding companies—the companies that own (often many) insurance companies, as well as other types of financial and nonfinancial companies.339 Insurance
regulators do not even require aggregate financial reporting at
the holding-company level, much less regulate core financial
measures at the holding-company level, such as capital levels.340
This approach to financial regulation is intimately bound up
with the state-based nature of insurance regulation: insurance
holding companies operate in numerous jurisdictions through
many different subsidiaries, making state coordination with respect to such holding companies much more complicated than
state coordination with respect to individual insurers.341
States’ limited perspective on the operations of insurance
holding companies means that insurance regulators are inherently more likely to overlook the potential for systemic risk to
emerge within the insurance system. Supervisors of individual
entities within a financial conglomerate naturally lack a complete
and coherent understanding of the business and risks associated

338 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, The United States Insurance Financial Solvency Framework 2–3 (2010) (describing the accreditation program
and deference by insurance regulators to the solvency regulation of an insurer’s domestic
state). This approach is combined with rules that attempt to ensure the ring-fencing of
individual insurance companies from the risks of their affiliates. Ring-fencing can be understood as legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risk. “The deconstruction can occur in various ways: by separating risky assets from
the firm, by preventing the firm itself from engaging in risky activities or investing in
risky assets, or by protecting the firm from affiliate and bankruptcy [and insolvency]
risks.” Schwarcz, 87 S Cal L Rev at 72 (cited in note 200).
339 To be sure, state insurance regulators have recently increased their efforts to
understand risks at the holding-company level. First, they have increased their ability to
access information about activities within the group and are afforded rights of inspection. See Kris DeFrain, Insurance Group Supervision, CIPR Newsletter (NAIC Apr 2012),
online at http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol3_ins_group_supervision.htm (visited Nov 3, 2014). Second, they are in the process of adopting a qualitative riskmanagement report, entitled the Own Risk Solvency Assessment, which would be compiled at the holding-company level. See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (May 2014), online at http://www.naic.org/
cipr_topics/topic_own_risk_solvency_assessment.htm (visited Nov 3, 2014).
340 See DeFrain, Insurance Group Supervisors (cited in note 339).
341 To be sure, states do attempt to coordinate their regulation of insurance groups
through supervisory colleges and the designation of lead regulators. See FIO, How to Modernize at *42 (cited in note 200). Although valuable, these mechanisms largely act as periodic check-ins among the regulators of the individual insurance companies within the insurance group, rather than as a sustained attempt to regulate the holding company.
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with the conglomerate as a whole.342 Risk management, investment strategies, reserving strategies, and the like are all generally determined not by the managers or directors of individual
legal entities, but instead by the managers and directors of the
holding company.343 Because regulation is not focused on the
holding company, state insurance regulators risk failing to appreciate potential precursors to systemic risk. All of this is well
illustrated by AIG: because insurance regulators focused attention on individual insurers within AIG, they missed the fact that
an AIG noninsurer affiliate was using insurers’ assets to support
risky securities-lending operations.344
B.

One Option for Enhancing Federal Involvement in State
Insurance Regulation: Expanding the FIO’s Authority

The federal role in insurance regulation has been a perennial subject of debate for over half a century. Academics and policymakers have advanced numerous proposals to partially or entirely federalize insurance, and some of these have found their
way into proposed legislation.345 In most cases, these proposals
to enhance federal authority over insurance regulation are principally motivated by the perceived inefficiencies of state regulation, which tends to result in decreased uniformity of regulatory
rules and increased compliance costs for insurers.346 By contrast,
this Article suggests that direct federal involvement in insurance

342 See Andrew Kuritzkes, Til Schuermann, and Scott M. Weiner, Risk Measurement, Risk Management, and Capital Adequacy in Financial Conglomerates, in Robert E.
Litan and Richard Herring, eds, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 2003
141, 151 (Brookings 2003) (noting that supervisors of individual subsidiaries within financial conglomerates face challenges in managing risk because they lack a “group-wide
perspective”).
343 See Elizabeth F. Brown, The New Laws and Regulations for Financial Conglomerates: Will They Better Manage the Risks than the Previous Ones?, 60 Am U L Rev 1339,
1357 (2011). Entity-based regulation has led to other problems including double or multiple gearing, contagion risk, concentration risk, conflicts of interest, and intragroup exposure. See Bank for International Settlements, Principles for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates Consultative Document 15 (Sept 2012).
344 See Part I.B.
345 See, for example, Schwarcz, 94 Minn L Rev at 1720–24 (cited in note 19).
346 See, for example, Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, The Single-License Solution, 31 Reg 36, 36–38 (2008–2009); Grace and Scott, An Optional Federal Charter at
59–75 (cited in note 287); Martin F. Grace and Robert W. Klein, Insurance Regulation:
The Need for Policy Reform, in Grace and Klein, eds, The Future of Insurance Regulation
in the United States 117, 126–30, 134–39 (cited in note 19). See also generally Peter J.
Wallison, ed, Optional Federal Chartering and Regulation of Insurance Companies
(American Enterprise Institute 2000).
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regulation is necessary to address the potential that systemic
risk in insurance might arise within entire sectors of the insurance industry.
One potentially sensible way to respond to this risk would
be to enhance the capacity of the FIO to shape insurance regulation when it has credibly determined that doing so is necessary
to help monitor, manage, or prevent systemic risk in insurance.
The FIO is relatively well situated to take on this role for the
very reasons that states are not. First, the FIO is politically accountable to a federal constituency: the president appoints the
director of the FIO, and the FIO itself is housed within the Department of the Treasury.347 For these reasons, the FIO would
generally internalize the potential costs and benefits of regulations that attempt to target the prospect of systemic risk in insurance.348 Additionally, as noted earlier, Dodd-Frank envisions
the FIO as the primary representative of the country’s interests
in international discussions of insurance regulation in fora such
as the IAIS.349 Elevating the power of the FIO to address the
prospect of systemic risk in insurance—something that the international community has expressly endorsed in its own “peer
review” of US insurance regulation350—would help support the
development of international norms and coordination on regulating systemic risk and insurance, consistent with the internationalization principle and the international ramifications of
systemic risk.
Second, the FIO’s current structure and statutory responsibilities give it a good deal of expertise in systemic risk. Under
Dodd-Frank, the FIO’s director is a nonvoting member of FSOC,
meaning that he and his staff are actively involved in thinking
about systemic risk in insurance.351 Indeed, the first statutory
goal of the FIO is to monitor the insurance industry and its regulation for potential systemic risk.352 The FIO’s placement within the Department of the Treasury means that it can draw on
the expertise and perspective of various federal agencies and
347

See Dodd-Frank § 313(a), 124 Stat at 1580, codified at 31 USC § 313(a).
See Part III.A.
349 See Part III.A.
350 See Financial Stability Board, Peer Review at *11–12 (cited in note 326) (“The
FIO should enhance its monitoring of the sector through increased use of non-public information, and be further strengthened to be able to take action to address issues and
gaps identified.”).
351 Dodd-Frank § 502(a)(3), 124 Stat at 1581, codified at 31 USC § 313(c)(3).
352 Dodd-Frank § 502(a)(3), 124 Stat at 1580, codified at 31 USC § 313(c)(1)(A).
348
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departments that regulate financial affairs.353 So too can it draw
on the views of a variety of experts, through a Federal Advisory
Council on Insurance that advises the FIO.354
There are various potential approaches to allowing the FIO
to take on an enhanced role in shaping state insurance regulation to monitor and account for systemic risk.355 Perhaps the
most sensible is to empower the FIO to develop federal standards that would then preempt state laws if they were not adequately implemented by the states.356 This type of power would
be most useful in allowing the FIO to address systemic risks
that arise due to inadequacies in the specific laws and regulations of states. For instance, the FIO has suggested that shadow
insurance poses a potential for systemic risk.357 One of the big
problems in this domain is that carriers can choose to establish
their captives in any state.358 This has arguably resulted in a
race to the bottom as a few states have developed particularly
lax rules for such captives regarding issues such as what types
of assets can be held against liabilities.359 Empowering the FIO
to set minimum standards for captives of insurance companies
could help address this risk.
As the FIO’s modernization report recognizes, this approach
would prove more challenging to the extent that it involves not
simply the preemption of state laws, but the establishment of
additional requirements for certain sectors of the insurance industry.360 The effectiveness of any such affirmative federal requirements would depend on the quality and uniformity of their
enforcement.361 The FIO thus suggests that this type of approach
“must specify standards, processes, and a deadline in order to

353 See Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 Harv L Rev 1131, 1184–86 (2012) (arguing that interagency coordination
helps agencies improve their decisionmaking process).
354 See US Department of the Treasury, Application for Membership on the Federal
Advisory Committee on Insurance, 79 Fed Reg 1672, 1672–73 (Jan 9, 2014).
355 See FIO, How to Modernize at *8–10 (cited in note 200) (discussing various potential approaches to enhancing federal involvement in insurance regulation).
356 This proposal is described as a “state passport” system in the FIO’s modernization
report and was originally suggested by the Financial Services Roundtable. See id at *9.
357 See id at *32–34.
358 See Part II.B.
359 See FIO, How to Modernize at *1 (cited in note 200).
360 See id at *8.
361 See id at *9.
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minimize or eliminate the prospect of variance among the
states.”362
Another potential solution to this dilemma would be to empower the FIO to take over enforcement authority in cases in
which state enforcement is deemed to be lacking. In many ways,
this approach would resemble that embraced by the Affordable
Care Act, under which states are permitted to establish their
own insurance exchanges, but the federal government retains
the authority to do this if states refuse.363 This type of solution
would likely be effective only if most states generally accepted
the invitation to enforce FIO-promulgated rules. The FIO’s
budget and resources are not designed to support an active enforcement regime.364 However, state refusal to enforce federally
developed standards would presumably be much less likely in
this setting than in the health insurance setting.365 Health care
reform has, of course, been immensely controversial, and states’
refusal to implement a federal regime can be almost entirely attributed to that fact.366 It is hard to imagine that a narrow increase in the FIO’s regulatory authority would occasion anything like this type of controversy. Moreover, a key factor in
states’ resistance to developing insurance exchanges was the
fact that these exchanges would require the development of an
entirely new state entity.367 By contrast, the proposal here would
simply permit enforcement by an existing agency.
A key benefit of empowering the FIO to preempt state law
and promulgate its own regulations would be that it would force
states to work actively and cooperatively with the FIO. To this
point, states have either resisted or ignored many of the FIO’s
suggestions. For instance, states have refused to allow the FIO
to attend meetings of supervisory colleges—wherein regulators
discuss the risks associated with entire holding companies—by
arguing that the FIO’s involvement would not be appropriate.368
362

Id.
See Affordable Care Act § 1321(c), Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119, 186, codified
at 42 USC § 18041.
364 See Financial Stability Board, Peer Review at *31, 36 (cited in note 326) (noting
the FIO’s limited resources).
365 For discussion of states’ refusal to establish their own insurance exchanges, see
generally David K. Jones and Scott L. Greer, State Politics and the Creation of Health
Insurance Exchanges, 103 Am J Pub Health e8 (2013).
366 See id at e9.
367 See id at e8.
368 See Leonardi Testimony at *2 (cited in note 121) (resisting various reform recommendations suggested by the FIO, particularly the participation of the FIO in supervisory
363
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Presumably, states would take a more accommodating perspective on including the FIO within supervisory colleges if the FIO
was given clear authority to preempt state law.
To be sure, empowering the FIO as we suggest could result
in it using this authority to unduly aggrandize its influence. The
risk of regulatory aggrandizement is a common concern in regulatory design.369 This risk might be heightened here, as the FIO’s
influence has historically been limited and might remain so in
the absence of it using the authority contemplated herein. Additionally, the FIO’s limited independence and budgetary authority also raise potential difficulties that might have to be addressed in any legislative effort to enhance the FIO’s role in
insurance regulation.
One potentially effective way to guard against this type of
risk would be to require the FIO to secure the approval of some
percentage of voting members of FSOC before promulgating new
rules that would preempt state law. In that context, FSOC
might be asked to determine whether the proposed rules are truly necessary to address the legitimate prospect of systemic risk
in insurance.370 As part of that determination, FSOC might consider the extent to which state regulators have been given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to address the deficiencies in state
regulation that the FIO would target. Because state insurance
regulators also have their own nonvoting member on FSOC,371
there would be limited risk that the FIO would be able to present a one-sided story about the need for targeted federal intervention to address systemic risk.
Ultimately, various options other than expanding the FIO’s
authority are available to enhance federal involvement in state
insurance regulation. To take the most obvious example, the
federal government might simply create an optional or mandatory federal charter for insurers. Such proposals implicate numerous issues other than systemic risk, including regulatory
colleges, as the “presence of a non-regulator, even as well intentioned as Treasury, would
threaten the objective independence of not just state regulators, but regulators at the federal and international levels who participate in the colleges, as well”).
369 See, for example, Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S Cal L Rev 903, 923
(1998) (observing that “regulators benefit from increased size and importance of their
own agencies”).
370 This approach would resemble FSOC’s current role in reviewing regulation by
the CFPB that could undermine systemic stability. See Dodd-Frank § 1023(a), 124 Stat
at 1985, codified at 12 USC § 5513(a).
371 Dodd-Frank § 111(b)(2), 124 Stat at 1393, codified at 12 USC § 5321(b)(2).
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uniformity, international coordination, and the substantive desirability of state insurance regulation. But this Article suggests
that at least one generally underappreciated virtue of most such
proposals is that they would enhance federal involvement in the
regulation of insurance markets, and thus the capacity of the
federal government to identify, monitor, and respond to the aggregation of systemic risk in that sector.
CONCLUSION
Although insurance companies and their affiliates played a
central role in the 2008 financial crisis, this country’s regulatory
response has focused on preventing a reoccurrence of the 2008
events instead of trying to more broadly understand why and
how insurers can be systemically risky. This Article argues that
insurance-focused financial firms can be systemically risky not
only due to their size—which is currently the primary focus of
federal regulation in insurance, spurred by AIG’s near failure—
but also due to commonalities and correlations in insurance
products, investment strategies, risk exposures, risk management, and interconnections to the larger financial system. Moreover, we argue, these commonalities, correlations, and interconnections are constantly changing, both in response to market
changes in the insurance industry and the changing role of insurance within the larger financial industry.
Systemic risk regulation therefore presents a dynamic challenge, requiring an insurance regulatory structure designed to
proactively identify, assess, and manage new potential sources
of systemic risk from the perspectives of the overall insurance
industry and its place within the financial system. The traditional system in the United States of state-based insurance regulation cannot adequately accomplish that. The fragmented nature of state regulation often prevents regulators from seeing
overall risks—such as the risks posed by an insurance holding
company that operates through multiple out-of-state subsidiaries. States also have inadequate incentives to police against
those risks. Their traditional goals include consumer protection
and premium tax collection; they have not focused on protecting
against systemically caused harm. Furthermore, state regulators
are unlikely to understand the changing role of insurance within
the larger financial industry; indeed, states have little regulatory
authority and expertise over that larger industry because banking
and securities regulation are almost entirely federally regulated.
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We therefore argue that the traditional state insurance regulatory regime should be supplemented by national regulation of
systemic risk in insurance. This could occur, for example, by expanding the authority of the US Treasury Department’s FIO,
originally created by the Dodd-Frank Act to have a limited monitoring role. That office itself recently suggested the potential
need for more robust federal intervention in state insurance
regulation. Any expanded authority of the FIO, we contend,
should include the power to supplement—and in appropriate
cases, even to preempt—state insurance laws if and when necessary to control systemic risk. The FIO should be well positioned
to regulate systemic risk given its accountability to a national
constituency as well as its mandate to develop a global perspective on the insurance industry.

